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1
Mark A. Graber 1

CONSTRUCTING CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THE RECONSTRUCTION
STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS

I.

Introduction

Contemporary constitutional theory has difficulty fully comprehending the relationship
between Dred Scott v. Sandford 2 and the post-Civil War Amendments. The connection seems
simple. Republicans proposed and ratified the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in part to
reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott. The Thirteenth Amendment’s declaration
that “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist in the United States” overturns the
sections in Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion which held that the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment vests persons with a constitutional right to bring their slaves into American
territories. 3 The declaration in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment that “all persons born or
naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States and of the State where they
reside” overturns the passages in the Dred Scott majority opinion holding that former slaves were
constitutionally barred from becoming citizens of the United States. 4 The problem with this
conventional view is that Republicans in 1866 had good reasons for thinking that passing
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Sandy Levinson, Jack Balkin, Howard Gillman, Gerard Magliocca, Cynthia Nicoletti, Maxwell Sterans, and
Brandon Garrett all generously commented on previous versions of this manuscript. I have not yet had time to
incorporate the vast majority of their important suggestions.
2
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
3
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2
constitutional amendments was not an effective means for achieving those antislavery and
egalitarian ends. The standard Republican explanation for why the judicial majority reached
proslavery and racist conclusions in Dred Scott suggests that antislavery advocates should have
regarded constitutional amendments aimed at altering judicial practice as a waste of legislative
energy.
Republicans to a person insisted that the justices in Dred Scott unreasonably interpreted
the Constitution of 1789 when they ruled that Congress had no power to ban slavery in American
territories. 5 Virtually all antislavery activists believed that Article IV, Section 3 plainly entitled
the national legislature to prohibit human bondage in the western regions. 6 The phrase
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” in their view, obviously vested
federal authorities with the same power over slavery in national territories as state authorities had
to regulate human bondage within their jurisdictional boundaries. This antislavery conclusion
was buttressed by more than a half century of federal governance in the territories. Abraham
Lincoln and other Republicans maintained that Congress without serious objection in 1789
banned slavery in the Northwest Territories 7 and in 1820 banned slavery in all territories north of
the 36°30′ parallel line. 8 Many Republicans thought the due process clause of the Fifth
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Prominent Republicans before the Civil War were publicly more divided on the citizenship status of free blacks.
See Abraham Lincoln, “Seventh and Last Debate with Stephan A. Douglas at Alton Illinois,” The Collected Works
of Abraham Lincoln (edited by Roy P. Basler) (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, NJ, 1953), p. 299
(declaring that he had never “complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it declared . . . that a negro
could not be a citizen).”
6
A few radical abolitionists claimed that the Constitution was a pro-slavery “covenant with death and an agreement
with hell” that provided extensive protections for human bondage. “Covenant with Death,” Liberator, March 13,
1863, p. 1. See Wendell Phillips, The Constitution a Pro-Slavery compact, or Extracts from the Madison papers, etc.
(American Antislavery Society: New York, 1856).
7
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Contrary to Republican claims, many Southerners during the Missouri Compromise debates insisted that Congress
had no power to ban slavery in the territories. See Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2006), pp. ___.

3
Amendment affirmatively prohibited slavery in the territories. 9 Few if any before the Civil War
confessed that the status of slavery in the territories was a close constitutional question upon
which persons in good faith might disagree. Lincoln described Dred Scott as an “obvious
mistake.” 10 Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine in 1858 declared that the judicial decision
was “utterly at variance with all truth . . ., utterly destitute of all legal logic . . ., found on error,
and unsupported by anything like argument.” 11
Republican claims that no responsible constitutional decision maker could conclude that
slaveholders had a right to bring their human property into the territories make problematic the
apparent Republican decision during the mid-1860s to reverse Dred Scott by ratifying better
constitutional language. The same justices who Republicans condemned for ignoring or
perverting the plain meaning of Article IV, Section 3 could presumably in the future ignore or
pervert the plain meaning of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pro-slavery justices in
1868 might even have been able to make interpretively competent claims that states could pass
numerous measures designed to control an “unruly” black labor force that were consistent the
constitutional ban on slavery. If, as Howard Gillman details, antebellum constitutional
authorities thought state and federal laws could make distinctions between classes of persons
when the legislation was based on real differences between affected groups and served the public
welfare, 12 then white supremacists might without much legal difficulty sustain state laws making
racial discriminations that were based on what most people living at the end of the Civil War
thought were real differences between the races. Equal protection clause precedents justifying
9

Abraham Lincoln’s speech at Cooper Union is the best known example of this defense of federal power to ban
slavery in the territories. See Abraham Lincoln, “Address at Cooper Institute, New York City,” 4 Collected Works,
pp. 523-35.
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Lincoln, “Cooper Institute, “ p. 546,
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Congressional Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 617.
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Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence
(Duke University Press: Durham, NC, 1993), pp. 61-62.
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state bans on women practicing law in part because “the civil law, as well as nature herself, has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman” 13 could easily be extended to cover laws prohibiting persons of color from practicing
law on the basis of perceived natural differences between members of different races. 14
The persons who framed the post-Civil War Amendments had no good reason for
thinking that racist, pro-slavery constitutional authorities, whom they thought had repeatedly
ignored the plain meaning of the antebellum Constitution, would behave better when interpreting
the plain meaning of the post-bellum Constitution. Republicans did not regard Dred Scott as the
unfortunate consequence of a few aberrant justices. They asserted t the Supreme Court’s
proslavery rulings were part of a broader Slave Power plot against the Constitution. Lincoln in
his debates with Douglas claimed that the Dred Scott decision was a product of a conspiracy
between Democrats in all three branches of the national government. 15 Senator John Hale of
New Hampshire was one of many antislavery advocates who maintained that “The Supreme
Court has been a part of the machinery of the old Democratic party.” This court,” he continued,
“have not been careful to study and find out and declare the law; but they have been careful to
declare what was agreeable to the party in power.” 16 Much evidence indicated that the
constitutional future would resemble the constitutional past. The leaders of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress were familiar with accounts from northern visitors to the southern states that described
in detail how a revived Slave Power was planning on regaining control of the national
government and rendering practical nullities those constitutional amendments passed during the
13

See, i.e., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (claiming that real differences
between men and women justified a state law prohibiting women from practicing law).
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Cite to Stephenson, Racial Distinctions. More creative constitutional decisions makers might claim that the
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments have never been ratified, see Bruce Ackerman, FIND, or that they were
unconstitutional constitutional amendments. See Leser v. Garnett. FIND. On unconstitutional constitutional
amendments in general, see Murphy; Graber.
15
16

Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 26
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short interregnum of Republican rule. In a widely circulated analysis of conditions in the former
Confederate states in the wake of the Civil War, Carl Schurz reported “a desire to preserve
slavery in its original form as much and as long as possible.” 17 A prominent Northern journalist
on a southern journey observed former slave state elites committed to do what was political
necessary
to obtain the exclusive control of the freedmen and to make such laws for them as
shall embody the prejudices of the late slave-holding society; to govern not only
their own states but to regain their forfeited leadership in the affairs of the nation;
to effect the repudiation of the national debt or to get the Confederate debt and the
Rebel state debts assumed by the whole country; to secure payment for their
slaves, and for all injuries and losses occasioned by the war.
Combatting this threat to the fruits of the Union victory in the Civil War merely by adding more,
perhaps clearer, words to the Constitution of the United States, from the perspective of
Republicans on the eve of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, was as likely to be as effective as the
behavior of the lost American tourist in outer Slobobia who attempts to get a local resident to
understand English by repeating more slowly and at greater volume the sentence “where is the
nearest gas station.”
This paper maintains that Republicans when drafting the Fourteenth Amendment sought
to avoid a repeat of such constitutional perversions as Dred Scott by constructing a constitutional
politics that guaranteed to the extent feasible that the persons who remained loyal to the Union
during the Civil War, white and black, would control the meaning of the post-Civil War
Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment had already abolished slavery. The Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to prevent the rebirth of the Slave Power. Sections 2 and 3 the
Fourteenth Amendment were the texts most crucial to this constitutional mission. Members of
17

Carl Schurz, “Report on the Condition of the South,” Senate Document No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1865). Other northerners travelling south at this time reached the same conclusion. See notes ---, below,
and the relevant text.
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the Thirty-Ninth Congress thought these provisions would most likely compel the South to
enfranchise persons of color and, if not, sharply reduce the influence of former slave states and
slaveowers on national policy and constitutional decision making. Republicans cheerfully
endorsed the more substantive provisions in Section 1 (and Section 4). Nevertheless, the
Republican leadership in the House and Senate understood that the rights, restrictions and
powers enumerated in Section 1, 4, and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as those
enumerated in Sections 1 and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, would be interpreted and
implemented in good faith only if Sections 2 and 3 successfully reconstructed American
constitutional politics so as to ensure the continued hegemony of the political party of the people
who remained loyal during the Civil War. We can understand the vital role Section 2 and 3
played in Republican constitutional thought and fully comprehend the relationship between Dred
Scott and the post-Civil War constitutional amendments, however, only if we turn away from a
constitutional theory obsessed constitutional law and interpreting what constitutional provisions
mean and focus on a constitutional theory devoted constitutional politics and the study of how
constitutions work and might be made to work better.
Constitutional commentators fail to appreciate Section 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in particular and how constitutions work more generally because they think of
constitutions as devices that create and restrict official power. Constitutional analysis in most
universities is largely confined to the study of constitutional law. Leading scholars define
constitutionalism as a system of legal constraints on official power. Giovanni Sartori regards a
constitution as “a fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative
institutional arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a ‘limited

7
government.’” 18 Chief Justice John Roberts in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius declared, “The Federal Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers,” and this “enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he
enumerated presupposes something not enumerated.’” 19
Constitutional provisions in constitutions that work primarily by creating and
constraining government power are framed to address some inadequacy in preexisting
constitutional rights, powers and restrictions. The Fourteenth Amendment, from this
perspective, was motivated by Republican concerns with Black Codes and related southern
efforts to preserve previous labor relationships and racial hierarchies in the former Confederate
states. Justice Samuel Miller expressed what has become common wisdom when in his opinion
in the Slaughter-House Cases he declared, “circumstances . . . forced upon the statesmen who
had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the rebellion, and who
supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the result of their labors,
the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the
unfortunate race who had suffered so much.” 20 The appropriate constitutional response to
southern attempts to retain powerful racial hierarchies, Miller and those who accept his history
assume, was a constitutional amendment that restricted state power to create racial hierarchies
and vested Congress with more power to achieve the constitutional commitment to equality
under law. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Black Codes and related measures.

18

Giovanni Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion,” 56 American Political Science Review 853, 855
(1962). See Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, Sotorios A. Barber, and Stephen Macedo, American
Constitutional Interpretation (3rd ed.) (Foundation Press: New York, 2003), pp. 48-49. On liberal constitutionalism
in general, see Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press: New
York, 2013), pp. 35-37.
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the federal government to enforce those
limitations on state power.
Contemporary constitutional theory’s emphasis on interpretation follows from
contemporary constitutional theory’s understanding of how constitutions work. Constitutions
that work by constraining and creating official power must be interpreted (or constructed) 21 in
order to determine the scope of the enumerated rights, restrictions and powers. What
Republicans did when they drafted Section 1 depends on what such phrases as “equal protection
of the laws” mean. What Republicans thought they were doing depends on what they thought
the language they used meant. Through interpretation, originalist or otherwise, we learn how the
Fourteenth Amendment changed constitutional law by enumerating new constitutional rights,
new federal powers, and new restrictions on state power. Working from this legal perspective,
the voluminous literature on the Fourteenth Amendment asks such questions as “Does the equal
protection clause prohibit segregated schools” and “Which branch of the national government
has the final authority to determine the meaning of the equal protection clause.”
Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment are better conceptualized as means for
constructing constitutional politics than as constraints on constitutional politics. The main
concern that animated the Fourteenth Amendment was the Republican fear that a united south
would combine with the Democratic Party to undo the fruits of the Civil War, most notably the
newly minted constitutional ban on slavery. Republicans members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
were more concerned with ensuring that existing constitutional rights would be respected and
existing constitutional powers exercised appropriately than with enumerating additional
constitutional rights and powers. The persons responsible for drafting the Fourteenth
21

See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (Harvard
University Press: Cambridge, MA 2001).
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Amendment discussed numerous means for ensuring that the persons who remained loyal to the
Union during the Civil War would control the interpretation of existing constitutional rights,
powers, and restrictions. Section 2, they believed, would force southerners to choose between
empowering black voters who would vote Republican or losing substantial representation in both
Congress and the Electoral College. Proposed versions of Section 3 placed sharp limits on the
capacity of former Confederates to participate in national affairs.
The shift from how constitutions create and constrain politics to how constitutions
construct politics alters the focus of constitutional analysis from what constitutional provisions
mean to how they work. The Fourteenth Amendment provides an easy illustration of the
difference between these two modes of constitutional analysis. Most Republican members of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress did not believe that any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment legally
compelled states to grant male persons of color the right to vote. Nevertheless, most believed
that if the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, southern states would grant male persons of color
the ballot when the alternative was a state delegation in Congress and in the Electoral College
reduced by forty percent. Rather than making dramatic changes in the texts constitutional
decision makers interpreted, Republicans sought to influence the selection of the constitutional
decision makers who would interpret the post-bellum constitution. The post-bellum Constitution
would work because Republicans rather than Democrats or former slaveholders would control
the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional texts that articulated a
commitment to equality under law.
The primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to construct the constitutional
politics that would guarantee the fruits of the northern victory and ensure meaningful
implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Reconstruction Republicans were far more
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concerned with constructing a politics that would guarantee the enduring ascendancy of the
victorious northern majority than with placing any particular limits on what that majority would
do. This explains why the persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment debated at length
the precise language of Sections 2, which concerned the allocation of representation in the House
of Representatives and votes in the Electoral College, and 3, which concerned restrictions on the
political rights of former Confederates, while devoting very little attention to various versions of
Section 1, which enumerates constitutional rights and powers. Republicans settled intra-party
disputes over how best to restructure constitutional politics. They agreed to disagree on the
precise rights protected by the post-bellum Constitution. 22
The following pages detail the Republican effort to construct a constitutional politics that
privileged the rights and interests of those Americans, white and black, who were loyal to the
Union during the Civil War. Part II provides context by offering a brief history of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Congress and discussing the various strategies open to Republicans and other
constitutional framers for privileging fundamental rights, important interests and favored
policies. These strategies, which include efforts to create, constrain, construct, and constitute
constitutional politics, are connected. The creation and maintenance of a constitutional order
requires self-conscious efforts to align a particular set of values, particular institutions that can
achieve those values, and a people who must share those values and be capable of operating the
institutions. 23 Part III focuses on the constitutional misalignments that animated the Fourteenth
Amendment, in particular the threats the emerged after the Civil War to the continued hegemony
of the Republican Party. During the mid-nineteenth century, Martin Van Buren, Abraham
Lincoln and others came to regard the legitimate party of the people as the institution ultimately
22
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responsible for preserving constitutional commitments and resolving constitutional disputes.
The Republican Party was the means by which antislavery advocates sought to preserve what
they perceived as the original antislavery commitments of the Constitution. Republicans drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment because they perceived a dire threat to theirparty’s capacity to
control the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. Most thought that Congress under the
Thirteenth Amendment already had the constitutional powers necessary to promote the
constitutional commitment to equality under law. They feared that the Thirteenth Amendment,
by permitting southern states to count disenfranchised persons of color as full persons for
purposes of allocating representatives in Congress and votes in the Electoral College, might
privilege the election of Democrats. Democrats in power would repeal laws Republicans had
passed under the Thirteenth Amendment, restore to a fair degree antebellum labor relations in the
South and, when challenged, interpret in bad faith constitutional provisions intended to articulate
a national commitment to equality under law. Part IV discusses how Republicans responded to
the threat of a revived Slave Power by drafting constitutional amendments that they believed
would construct a constitutional politics that privileged the Republican Party. Thaddeus Stevens
and others made no distinction between constitutional right and partisan advantage because they
believed that only Republicans were committed to the Union and fundamental constitutional
values and because all Republicans needed to retain control of the national government was a
constitutional politics that privileged the choices made by a majority of the people who remained
loyal to the Union during the Civil War. More concerned with the constitutional politics
necessary to sustain egalitarian constitutional commitments than to constitutional law,
Republicans devoted almost all of their attention to the language of Section 2 which they thought
would secure black suffrage, and Section 3, which limited the influence of former Confederates
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on national power. John Bingham aside, very few members of Congress thought Section 1
contributed much more than a restatement of existing constitutional commitments and fewer
thought those commitments would survive in the absence of a constitutional politics structured to
privilege the political party that championed those commitments. Even fewer members
discussed constitutional authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Republicans were
concerned with maintaining their control over all national institutions. Twenty-first century
concerns with resolving constitutional disputes between different branches of the national
government were not on the agenda, at least when the Fourteenth Amendment was on the table.
Part V details why the Fourteenth Amendment failed and was superseded. Crucial Republican
representatives shortly after framing the Fourteenth Amendment lost interest in building a strong
Republican Party in the South limiting the influence of southern whites on national policy in part
because they perceived the party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War better
secure voting majorities in the North retain sufficient control of the national government by
admitting unpopulated western states that supported Republican candidates and servicing those
white constituencies than by aggressively defending racial equality. As both the Republican
Party and Democratic Party lost their ideological edges, a new constitutional regime emerged. In
this political order, eventually entrenched by the New Deal, courts rather than parties became the
institution most responsible for preserving constitutional commitments and resolving
constitutional ambiguities. Part VI concludes by briefly exploring the hold John Bingham has on
contemporary American constitutionalism. John Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment is our
Fourteenth Amendment. His influence explains how Americans think about what the Fourteenth
Amendment means, how we think about the way the Fourteenth Amendment is supposed to
work, and why American constitutionalism is seeming committed to the very bizarre view that

13
the best way to change such bad constitutional decisions as Dred Scott is by changing the
constitutional text rather than changing the constitutional decision makers. Thaddeus Stevens
knew otherwise, but too much constitutional history regards him as either a visionary committed
to “forty acres and a mule” 24and a racial bent “upon a policy of revenge and self-perpetuation,” 25
rather than the framer most concerned about the constitutional politics necessary the post-bellum
constitutional commitment to equality under law.
Much of this paper compares and contrasts what Bingham and Stevens thought about
how the Fourteenth Amendment should work. Both supported similar texts. Both agreed that
the Constitution should include a substantive commitment to equality under law and enumerate
certain fundamental rights and restrictions on government. Both agreed that the way
representatives were allocated needed to be adjusted in light of the Thirteenth Amendment,
although Stevens pushed far harder than Bingham for black suffrage and restrictions on
participation by former Confederates in national policy making. What they disputed was the
mechanisms by which the post-Civil War constitutional order would best secure an egalitarian,
free labor regime. Bingham consistently maintained that persons of color and southern Unionists
were best protected by new enumerated rights and powers. Stevens insisted that former slaves
and Southern unionists were best protected by a reconstructed constitutional politics. John
Bingham invented the Fourteenth Amendment of contemporary constitutional theory. 26 Scholars
interested in how the Fourteenth Amendment has actually worked for almost one-hundred and
fifty years might nevertheless find Thaddeus Stevens more insightful, particularly if they want
the Fourteenth Amendment to work differently than at present.

24
25
26
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McCloskey, p. 73.

14
Stevens teaches essential, but limited lessons. His speeches on the floor of Congress
serve as vital constitutional reminders that no scheme of constitutional rights and powers is likely
to function unless complemented by a constitutional politics that privileges the values underlying
those rights and powers. The history of the Fourteenth Amendment highlights, however, the
problems inherent in any effort to entrench any constitutional politics. To begin with, as Stevens
recognized, the scheme may not be adequate from the outset. As important, constitutional
politics inevitably changes in ways that confound the hopes of constitutional framers. Both
Madison’s vision of a partyless Constitution and Steven’s vision of a Constitution operated by an
ideological Republican party began to fall apart within a decade. The central problems of
American constitutional theory, these examples suggest, are not simply to figure out how to align
constitutional commitments and constitutional politics, but to figure out how governance can
take place during the numerous periods on which constitutional commitments and constitutional
politics are out of phase.

II.

Context

Republicans when the Thirty-Ninth Congress met in December 1865 were presented with
numerous options for protecting the fundamental rights of former slaves and preserving the fruits
of the Union victory in the Civil War. Some options were textual. Republicans debated at
length the precise language of proposed Fourteenth Amendments. Other options were
functional. Republicans considered the various ways that constitutional language might achieve
the goals of the successful antislavery movement. The Fourteenth Amendment that the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction first proposed sought to construct constitutional politics by

15
depriving former slave states of substantial representation in Congress and the Electoral College
unless they enfranchised persons of color. The second Fourteenth Amendment that the Joint
Committee proposed sought to constrain and create constitutional politics by enumerating
additional congressional powers to restrict state legislatures from violating certain fundamental
rights, most notably the right to equality before law. The final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment both constrained and constructed constitutional politics. Section 1 and Section 4
limited official power. Section 2 and, to a lesser extent, Section 3 reconstructed constitutional
politics. The precise relationship between all five sections of the Fourteenth Amendment was
not entirely clear, at least from a simple reading of the text.

A. A Brief History of the Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment 27

The Thirty-Ninth Congress recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment did not provide an
adequate constitutional foundation for Reconstruction. Within days, House and Senate
Republicans agreed to establish a Joint Committee on Reconstruction, chaired by Senator
William Pitt Fessenden of Maine. The Committee, which was composed of nine members of the
House and six Senators was officially charged only with “inquir[ing] into the condition of the
States which formed the so-called confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any
of them, are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress.” 28 Although members spent
some time determining whether and when such states as Tennessee would be represented in
Congress, the primary task of the Joint Committee was to serve as a clearinghouse for the

27

The best narrative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is Joseph B. James, The Framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1956). See also Benjamin Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, 39th Congress, 1865-1867 (Negro Universities Press: New York, 1969).
28
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 46.
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numerous constitutional amendments being proposed by House and Senate Republicans.
Republicans understood that, Tennessee aside, former Confederate states would not be
represented in the national legislature until they approved whatever constitutional amendments
the Joint Committee drafted and both houses of Congress approved.
The Joint Committee during the winter of 1866 unsuccessfully proposed two single-issue
constitutional amendments. The first Fourteenth Amendment the Joint Committee framed would
adjust on the basis of representation in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College.
That proposal declared,
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed;
provided that, whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any
State on account of race, or color, all persons of such race or color, shall be
excluded from the basis of representation. 29
After more than a month of debate, this Fourteenth Amendment was approved by the House of
Representatives, but did not obtain the constitutionally mandated two-thirds vote in the Senate.
Several prominent radicals, most notably Charles Sumner, objected to the inference that states
could constitutionally disenfranchise persons of color. 30 The proposed text, in their view,
implicitly repealed preexisting voting rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Guaranty Clause of Article IV. 31 While that proposal was being debated in the Senate, the Joint
Committee presented Congress with a more substantive amendment, which declared:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property. 32

29
30

Benjamin B. Kendrick, “The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction,” p. 53

31
32

Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1034.
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That proposal was tabled after two days of full debate in the House of Representatives. 33
Rather than continue framing constitutional amendments piecemeal, the Joint Committee
in the early spring, inspired by a draft put together by former congressman Robert Dale Owen, 34
combined various proposals into an omnibus constitutional amendment. After a good deal of
tinkering by the committee, members on April 30, 1865 presented the following Fourteenth
Amendment to the House and Senate.
Sec. 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of
its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged
except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in
such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one
years of age.
Sec. 3. Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons who
voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, shall be
excluded from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress, and for electors
for President and Vice President of the United States.
33
34

Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1095.
The original Owen plan declared:
Section 1: No discrimination shall be made by any State, not by the United States, as the
civil rights of persons, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. From and after the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, no
discrimination shall be made in any State nor by the United States, as to the enjoyment, by classes
of persons, of the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous condition or servitude.
Section 3. Until the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, no class of
persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage, discrimination, shall be made by any State,
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, shall be included in the basis of
representation.
Section 4. Debts incurred in aid of insurrection, or of war against the Union, and claims
of compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, shall not be paid by any State nor by the
United States.
Section 5. Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

James, Fourteenth Amendment, p. 100.
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Sec. 4. Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any
debt or obligation already incurred, or which may hereafter be incurred, in aid of
insurrection or of war against the United States, or any claim for compensation for
loss of involuntary service or labor.
Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article. 35
The House approved this Fourteenth Amendment on May 10, 1866, but the Senate balked in
large part because of objections to Section 3. In late May, after lengthy meetings of the Senate
Republican caucus, the Joint Committee presented a rewritten omnibus amendment. The Senate
tinkered a bit with Section 2 and 4. More serious revisions were made to Section 3. Congress
abandoned efforts to disenfranchise former Confederates and instead accepted a weaker
provision restricting office holding. On June 8, 1866, the upper house of Congress ratified the
final version of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 The House followed suit on June 13, 1866. 37 The
final version of the Fourteenth Amendment declares:
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of
a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such state.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
35
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under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support
the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
SECTION 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
B. Meaning and Doing in Constitutional Politics

1. Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Interpretation

Members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were engaged in constitutional politics when they
drafted, revised, rejected and approved different Fourteenth Amendments. They made choices
between various means for privileging fundamental rights, vital interests and desired policies.
These choices were informed by high political ideals and the political realities of American
politics at the end of the Civil War. While some debates in Congress were over the best
interpretation of preexisting and proposed constitutional language, what Republicans did from
December 1865 to June 1866 cannot be reduced to what the words they approved meant or
mean. All participants in constitutional politics, be they post-bellum Republicans, American
revolutionaries or leaders of various Iraqi factions, seek to create or reconstruct a feasible politics
that will faithfully implement enumerated constitutional rights and restrictions, as well as realize
numerous other values that may or may not be set out explicitly in the text. The study of

20
constitutional politics examines how constitutions were intended to work, actually work, and can
be made to work better.
The study of constitutional politics inevitably involves more traditional concerns about
constitutional interpretation. 38 How the Constitution was intended to work depends in part on
what framers thought the text meant and how they expected that text to be interpreted. How the
Constitution actually works at the turn of the twenty-first century depends in part on what
contemporary Americans think crucial constitutional provisions mean and on presently accepted
methods of constitutional interpretation. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment could not
influence on the constitutional regime if the language was gibberish. The way judicial adherence
to precedent helps structure constitutional decision making plays an important role in the present
working of the Constitution. 39 How the Constitution should work also depends in part on
theories of constitutional interpretation. The best method for interpreting a constitution designed
to preserve the hard-won gains of the past differs from the best method for interpreting a
“militant” constitution aimed at achieving some national aspiration. 40
Nevertheless, theories of constitutional politics encompass more phenomena than theories
of constitutional interpretation 41 or, for that matter, constitutional authority. 42 What people do
when they create, maintain, modify, or abandon constitutions differs from the meaning of the
words they use when changing constitutional texts. Constitutional reformers may be motivated
by desires to pacify political opposition or gain international aid. The Republicans who debated
the Fourteenth Amendment were concerned with being reelected as well as with protecting
38
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former slaves and southern unionists. 43 Constitutional reformers consider basic facts about the
political and cultural life of their society when anticipating how enumerated rights will be
interpreted and enumerated powers will be exercised. Constitutional protections for freedom of
religion in constitutional theocracies often transfer authority from sectarian prelates to secular
judges. 44 Madison thought Congress more likely to protect religious freedom than a state
legislature. 45 In sharp contrast to persons engaged in constitutional interpretation, persons
thinking about constitutional politics consider the possibility that constitutional provisions will
be misinterpreted. Republicans made certain decisions when framing the Fourteenth
Amendment, we shall see, because they feared a future constitutional politics in which a revived
Democratic Party majority did not interpret in good faith the Thirteenth Amendment.
Expectations play a different role in constitutional politics than in constitutional theory.
Disputes rage among originalists over the precise role of original constitutional expectations
when determining the meaning of constitutional provisions, 46 but no one thinks that the common
expectation that George Washington would become the first president gave Washington a
constitutional right to that office. Nevertheless, commentary on how the framers thought the
presidency would work routinely notes the uniform expectation that George Washington would
be the first president. 47 This expectation had constitutional consequences. The framers made
constitutional choices in light of their expectation that George Washington would be the first
43
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president. Pierce Butler, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, asserted, “I do
[not] believe they [the executive powers] would have been so great, had not many of the
members cast their eyes toward General Washington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the
Powers to be given a President, by their opinions of his Virtue.” 48 Had George Washington died
in 1788, a fair probability exists that constitutional institutions would not have worked as the
framers originally expected. The problem would not be that office holders interpreted the
Constitution wrongly, but that a crucial office holder making major constitutional decisions and
establishing vital constitutional precedents lacked the expected values, interest, or stature.

2. Strategies for Privileging Fundamental Rights, Vital Interests and Favored Policies

Enumeration is one constitutional strategy framers use for privileging fundamental rights,
vital interests and cherished policies. The Constitution seeks to prevent an aristocracy and forbid
persons from being boiled in oil in part through specific constitutional provisions that declare
“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States,” “No State shall , , , grant any Title
of Nobility,” and “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Constitutional provisions
privilege certain rights, interests and policies by enumerating powers as well as enumerating
rights. Such provisions create rather than constraint constitutional politics. The Constitution
seeks to promote economic prosperity and the property rights of ocean travelers in part by
constitutional provisions that authorize Congress to “regulate interstate commerce” and “punish
Piracies and Felonies committee on the high Seas.” 49 Enumerations may constrain or empower
private actors as well as government officials. The Thirteenth Amendment forbids one
48
49
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individual from enslaving another. Joseph Story interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause as
authorizing slaveholders to exercise the common law right of recaption. 50
The persons responsible for the Constitution of the United States preferred to privilege
what they perceived to be fundamental rights, vital interests and favored policies by constructing
constitutional politics rather than by enumerated constitutional constraints or constitutional
powers. 51 Prominent framers insisted that well-designed constitutional institutions were a better
means for preserving liberty than precise descriptions of constitutional powers and limits. As
arguably the single most important assertion in the Federalist states, “all observations founded
upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the
government, not to the nature or extent of its powers.” 52 Federalist 10 famously asserts that an
extended republic is the best constitutional means for securing proper rights and protecting
religious freedom. “Extend the sphere,” Madison declared, “and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other.” 53
Constitutional reformers have various goals in mind when proposing constitutional
provisions that construct constitutional politics. Some constitutional provisions are best
understood as vital companions to enumerated rights and restrictions. They are designed to
construct a constitutional politics in which those constitutional constraints are obeyed and
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enforced. The Supreme Court may be structured to ensure that governing officials respect clear
constitutional limits on their powers. Other constitutional provisions help construct a
constitutional politics that privileges certain outcomes among choices constitutionally open to
government officials. The Constitution permits Congress to set whatever income tax rates the
national legislators think best. Nevertheless, to the extent that business has a privilege position
in constitutional politics, 54 Congress is unlikely to choose tax rates unduly burdensome to the
investor class.

Still, other constitutional provisions influence how ambiguous constitutional

provisions are interpreted. Framers may not agree among themselves on what constitutes a
regulation of commerce or the free exercise of religion. Rather than resolve their differences
through clearer language, they may prefer to structure government institutions so that crucial
future constitutional-decision makers will interpret broad constitutional commands consistently
with the best theory of justice or those values that unite members of the Blue Party. Rather than
provide many constitutional protections for slavery, the persons responsible for the Constitution
designed a political system they believed in practice would guarantee a united coalition of slave
states a veto on national policy. 55
Constitutional reformers may also seek to realize their goals by constituting constitutional
politics. They do so when championing constitutional provisions that they believe will help
fashion a citizenry with certain values and interests. Madison was seeking to constitute
constitutional politics when he informed the First Congress that constitutional declaration of
rights “have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public
opinion in their favor.” 56 The Constitution, in this view, plays a crucial role in the process by
which Americans are socialized to respect such rights as the freedom of religion. To the extent
54
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popular majorities and political leaders by habit do not even think of burning heretics,
institutional precautions against an American Inquisition are unnecessary. Madison in the
Federalist maintained other basic constitutional goals could be achieved only if constitutional
practices promoted deep, widespread, and often unthinking, constitutional commitments.
Constitutional change should be difficult, he asserted, because “as every appeal to the people
would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great
measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite
stability.” 57
The way constitutions work by constraining, creating, and constructing constitutional
politics does not map neatly on to common distinctions between rights, powers, and procedures.
Some rights both constraint and construct politics. The framers thought jury trials were vital
means for privileging property and speech rights. 58 Some procedures may be valued for their
own sake rather than any tendency to bias politics in any way. People may favor majority rule
solely because they believe majorities have a right to rule, and not because they believe that
institutions yoked to majoritarian sentiment in their society are more likely to make particular
policies than other institutional arrangements. 59
With the important exception of façade constitutions whose framers have little interest in
actually implementing textual declarations 60 constitutions typically privilege favored rights,
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important interests, and desired policies through a combination of enumeration and institutional
design. Constitutional politics is created, constrained and constructed. The way in which the
Constitution protects the independent influence of state governments illustrates this interaction of
constitutional text and constitutional politics. Article I, Section 3 requires state equality in the
Senate. The framers assumed that senators interested in preserving their power and the power of
their home states would have the interests necessary to act consistently to preserve the vital
interests of states as states (including state equality in the Senate). 61 Federalist 45 details how
by constructing a constitutional politics in which states were involved in the selection of every
national elected official, the Constitution provided additional security for state governments.
Traditional state functions were safe in the new constitutional order, Madison wrote, because
“each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to
the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much
more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them.” 62
Madison was confident that a similar combination of text and institutional design would
construct a rights-protecting constitutional politics. In his speech introducing the Bill of Rights,
Madison pointed to several features of constitutional politics that he believed would make
enumerated rights effective. In his view, both the federal judiciary and state governments were
structured in ways conducive to protecting enumerated constitutional rights. “If they are
incorporated into the constitution,” Madison argued on the floor of Congress, “independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
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rights.” 63 The Bill of Rights, he continued, would also enable “state legislatures . . . to resist
with more effect every assumption of power.” 64
The persons responsible for the Constitution derisively referred to as “parchment
barriers” enumerated rights and restrictions that had no foundation in the underlying
constitutional politics. Their past experience demonstrated that clear constitutional guidelines,
standing alone, did not restrain officials bent on unconstitutional usurpations. Roger Sherman
informed New Englanders that “[n]o bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than
the honeymoon of a new married couple, unless the rulers were interested in preserving the
rights.” Government officials and popular majorities were free to rescind parchment barriers to
their preferred policies. “Neither would a general declaration of rights be any security,” Civic
Rusticus wrote, “for the sovereign who made it could repeal it.” 65
Parchment is hardly worthless or a unique to enumeration. Constitutional provisions
detailing the “composition and structure of government” have the same potential to become
parchment barriers as constitutional provisions protecting the freedom of speech. The crucial
point is that the framers in 1787 and the Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
recognized that constitutions do not function by pure textual fiat. Enumerated constitutional
restrictions are respected and enumerated constitutional powers are exercised only when they are
supported by the underlying constitutional politics. What constitutions mean in practice is a
function of text, institutions or and the political culture. The Thirteenth Amendment was likely
to abolish slavery only to the extent that the textual ban on human bondage provided antislavery
activists who controlled crucial government institutions with powers they believed they formerly
lacked, enabled antislavery activists to control crucial government institutions by fostering a
63
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constitutional culture increasingly committed to the abolition of slavery, or compelled persons
who favored slavery to nevertheless act consistently with this new constitutional provision.
Stephen Elkin provides the fundamental matrix for studying constitutional politics when
he observes that constitutional orders consist of a set of basic values, institutions that are
designed to realize those values, and a people who share those values and are capable of
operating the institutions.66 Constitutional reformers seek to align these values, institutions, and
people. In some cases, constitutional reforms are directed either at introducing new
constitutional values or emphasizing preexisting constitutional commitments that advocates are
confident have or will soon have broad popular and institutional support. The Thirteenth
Amendment, which committed the United States to the immediate abolition of slavery, reformed
or reasserted fundamental constitutional values. At least as often, constitution reformers attempt
to construct a constitutional politics that will better achieve what they perceive as preexisting
constitutional commitments. The Eleventh Amendment reflected preexisting commitments to
state sovereignty that proponents believed were abandoned in Chisholm v. Georgia. 67 Reformers
may prefer informal constitutional changes to amending the constitutional text as the means for
constructing a better constitutional politics. 68 Martin Van Buren and the founders of mass party
politics in the United States invented the legitimate party of the people to be a substitute for
checks and balances as a vital means for preserving the constitutional regime they believed was
founded in 1787. 69
The Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were well aware that
constitutions could malfunction because of misalignments between constitutional values and
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constitutional politics. They had witnessed such a malfunction during the decades immediately
before the Civil War. Antislavery advocates routinely complained about an aristocratic Slave
Power they believed was governing the United States in defiance of constitutional commitments
to majoritarianism and the eventual abolition of slavery. Charles Sumner and others accused the
Slave Power of transforming into a parchment barrier the constitutional right alleged fugitive
slaves enjoyed to a jury trial. Many Republicans charged that Slave Power aristocrats and their
northern doughface sycophants were perverting national powers, most notably the congressional
power to govern the territories, by adopting policies designed to entrench slavery rather than to
place human bondage on the “path of ultimate extinction” as intended by the Constitution.
During and immediately after the Civil War, Republicans took advantage of the absence of
southern representatives in Congress and the Electoral College first to recommit the Constitution
to the ultimate abolition of slavery and then to commit the Constitution to the actual abolition of
slavery. The challenge Republicans faced in the first winter after the end of the Civil War was
how constitutional politics could be reconstructed so that when southern officials returned to
Congress and the Electoral College, the Thirteenth Amendment did not become another
parchment barrier.

III.

Constitutional Failures: Past and Future

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitution was built on the ruins of the Constitution of
1789. Republicans before the Civil War celebrated what they perceived was the original
constitutional commitment to the “ultimate extinction in slavery.” 70 The problem, in their view,
was that constitutional politics was no longer structured to achieve that end. A mismatch had
70
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developed between constitutional purposes and constitutional institutions that explained why
crucial national decisions during the 1840s and 1850s entrenched human bondage in the United
States. Antislavery advocates condemned such decisions as Dred Scott v. Sandford, which
forbade legislation banning slavery in American territories, as outrageous denials of the
fundamental antislavery norms of the Constitution. Horace Greeley maintained the decision was
“entitled to just so much moral weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those
congregated in any Washington barroom.” 71 Greeley and other Republican critics of Taney
Court jurisprudence in slavery cases recognized that the problem was not simply that a few
aberrant justices were not being constrained by constitutional rules. Rather, they insisted that
such pro-slavery rulings as Dred Scott and Prigg v. Pennsylvania 72 were rooted in a
constitutional politics constructed to privileged the interests of a southern aristocracy. A Slave
Power had arisen that was taking advantage of constitutional forms to pervert both the
majoritarian and antislavery commitments of the Constitution. Slave Power agents in the judicial
decided Dred Scott, in the legislature passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and in the executive
fought to make Kansas a slave state. In order to combat this constitutional conspiracy,
antislavery advocates had to organize a political party dedicated to restoring the original
constitutional understanding of slavery. Americans would become recommitted to the animating
purpose of the Constitution of 1787, Republicans realized, only by imitating Democrats who had
abandoned the antipartisan constitutional politics the framers had thought necessary for
achieving vital constitutional ends.
The Republican Party was the main vehicle by which antislavery advocates before and
after the Civil War sought to reconstruct a more favorable constitutional politics. By organizing
71
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a political party and maintaining party discipline, antislavery advocates confirmed the most
important constitutional innovation of the mid-nineteenth century. The framers believed that
individual rights and the public interest could be secured only if government was rooted in a
complex system of checks and balances that prevented the rise of political parties. Jacksonians,
by comparison, insisted that individual rights and the public interest could be secured only if
ordinary Americans united in a political party that gave them the strength to resist various
oligarchies bent on perverting constitutional forms and values. Martin Van Buren understood
that what he perceived to be the original constitutional commitments to limited government and
federalism could be restored only if ordinary citizens in the all sections of the country united in a
political party and gained control over all national institutions. Abraham Lincoln understood that
what he perceived to be the original constitutional commitment to the end of slavery could be
restored only if the free citizens of the North united in a political party and gained control over
all national institutions. These united parties, Van Buren and Lincoln thought, were both the
main vehicle by which constitutional values were preserved and the main vehicle by which
constitutional disputes among the faithful were resolved.
Post-Civil War constitutional politics threatened the Republican majority that gained
control of the national government in 1860. Prior to the Civil War, the Slave Power was able to
dominant the national government in part because the three-fifths clause augmented southern
representation in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College. The Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery, promised to increase southern representation in Congress
and the Electoral College, as disenfranchised persons of color would now count as full persons
when seats in the House and votes in the Electoral College were allocated. Republicans who
journeyed south heard former slaveowners publicly brag about how, with the aid of this
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enhanced representation and northern Democrats, they would soon again control the national
government, establish near slave-like systems of labor, and force northern taxpayers to assume
southern debts incurred during the Civil War.
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to alleviate Republican fears that post-Civil
War constitutional politics might privilege a revived Slave Power rather than Republican
concerns that the national government lacked the constitutional power to prohibit the Black
Codes that were being enacted throughout the post-Civil War South. As the passage and defense
of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Second Freedman’s Bureau Act demonstrate, the
vast majority of Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress believed Congress was authorized by
the Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions, most notably the Guaranty
Clause of Article IV, to prohibit most if not all forms of race discrimination. Republicans knew,
however, that Democrats in power would either prevent anti-discrimination legislation from
becoming law or repeal such legislation on the books. The problem they faced when the ThirtyNinth Congress met was that the same Thirteenth Amendment that gave Republicans who
controlled the national government the power to promote equality under law also provided
Democrats with a golden opportunity to regain control over the national government and
dismantle the Republican program. With the very important exception of John Bingham,
Republicans in and out of Congress consistently regarded the threat to their constitutional vision
as coming from the way the Thirteenth Amendment altered structure of constitutional politics
rather than any inadequacies in the rights and powers to protect those rights enumerated by the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment was the culmination of a constitutional transformation from
a regime designed to rely on a constitutional politics that prevented the rise of parties to preserve
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fundamental constitutional commitments to a regime that relied on a particular political party to
preserve those values. The transformation began in the 1820s, when Jacksonian political
thinkers began to legitimate a permanent political party as the best means to parry aristocratic
threats to the democratic and substantive commitments of the original Constitution.
Republicans, while rejecting the pro-slavery commitments of the Democracy, nevertheless
endorsed Martin Van Buren’s claim that a permanent political party was the only means to parry
aristocratic threats to the democratic and substantive commitments of the original Constitution.
Democrats and Republicans differed only in their understanding of the aristocratic threats to the
constitutional order. Van Buren and Andrew Jackson fought the Money Power. Lincoln and
Thaddeus Stevens fought the Slave Power. A constitutional amendment was necessary in 1866,
the Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress agreed, in order to thwart renewed
aristocratic threats to the capacity of rightful sovereigns of the United States, the party of the
people who remained loyal during the Civil War, to maintain basic constitutional values and to
interpret constitutional ambiguities in light to these commitments.

A. Parties and the Mid-Nineteenth Constitutional Order

Americans during the mid-nineteenth century increasing regarded party as a necessary
means for preserving the Constitution and the appropriate vehicle for resolving constitutional
disputes. By forming a political party and accepting party discipline, such partisans as Martin
Van Buren and Abraham Lincoln insisted, ordinary citizens could prevent elite factions from
gaining control of the national government and perverting the constitutional order. contrast to
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the framers, who believed a sharp separation of powers necessary for preventing the tyranny of
the majority, leading constitutional practitioners after 1830 maintained that concentrated power
within a legitimate political party was necessary for preventing powerful minorities from seizing
control of the national government and subsequently exercising national power to advance their
narrow self-interest. Mass parties composed of ordinary citizens inhibited a constitutional
politics that favored either “the Money Power” or “the Slave Power.” These aristocratic cabals in
late Jacksonian America were seen as far greater threats to the constitutional order than the
popular majorities Madison feared might redistribute property or impose a religious orthodoxy.
Martin Van Buren, Abraham Lincoln, and other partisan activists substituted a legitimate
party, not a two-party system, for the separation of powers as the means for preserving American
constitutional commitments. As Gerald Leonard and Stephen Engel in particular have pointed
out, 73 the Jacksonian leaders who abandoned the founding commitment to a “Constitution
Against Parties” 74 defended the legitimate party of the people. They did not wax eloquent on the
virtues of competition between two or more parties for public offices. Democrats explained why
the Democracy was the only means for preventing the Money Power from controlling the
national government. Whigs explained why a counter coalition was the only means for
preventing Jacksonian spoilsmen from controlling the national government. Several decades
later, Republicans explained why their sectional party was the only means for preventing the
Slave Power from controlling the national government. Although a few prominent politicians
during the mid-nineteenth century praised two-party politics, 75 the legitimacy of competition
73
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between political parties or a party system was, at most, unclear when the Fourteenth
Amendment was being framed. 76

1. The Constitutional Mission of Parties

Martin Van Buren, the acknowledged architect of the nineteenth century American
constitutional order, had a profound, unrecognized influence on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Van Buren is well known as the founder of permanent political parties in the United States. The
primary mission of those parties was not, as sometimes supposed, “to solve the knotty
operational problems of governing under the Constitution.” 77 Rather, Van Buren regarded a
permanent party as the best means for preserving the Constitution. Unless ordinary people
organized, he and the other founders of party politics in the United States believed, elites would
gain power, substitute minority rule for the perceived constitutional commitment to
majoritarianism, and frustrate more substantive constitutional purposes. The Republicans who
framed the Fourteenth Amendment were animated by this partisan vision, even as they revised
Van Buren’s conceptions of the popular majority, the aristocratic threat to that majority, and the
most vital constitutional purposes.

public affairs were never better administered than during the [Jefferson administration] when measures were
proposed and advocated by the majority, under the vigilance and correction of the minority. . . . [T]he conflict of
parties is a noble conflict—of mind to mind, genius to genius”).
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A legitimate political party, before and after the Civil War, was entrusted with related
procedural and constitutional missions. By mobilizing ordinary citizens, the legitimate party of
the people prevented constitutional politics from being controlled by a political, economic or
sectional aristocracy. By keeping that aristocracy out of power, the legitimate party of the
people ensured that the Constitution was interpreted consistently with the goals of the founders.
Party organization and party discipline fostered a constitutional politics in which Americans
were governed by the persons or combination of persons that the Constitution authorized to
govern and consistently with the values the Constitution was designed to promote.
Martin Van Buren’s Democratic Party was organized on the basis of these constitutional
principles. Van Buren and his allies regarded the Democracy as the only means by which “the
Money Power” could be prevented from perverting the constitutional order. Through
organization, Democrats ensured that public offices remained in the hands of those persons who
had the best interests of ordinary persons at heart rather than those who sought to advance the
interest of the investor class. Democrats in power could be trusted to resist aristocratic attempts
to entrench the “latitudinarian” construction of the Constitution underlying federal support for
the national bank and internal improvements, legislation that further enriched the affluent class
and enfeebled those institutions, most notably local government, that best enabled ordinary
citizens to maintain control of the national government.
The Whig Party over time adopted this Jacksonian interpretation of the constitutional
mission of political parties. Party organization was necessary, such prominent Whigs as
Abraham Lincoln believed, 78 in order to alleviate the threat that elite Democrat office-holders
presented to the constitutional order. Whigs would preserve constitutional order by replacing
Jacksonian placemen, who were concerned only with gaining office and enjoying the spoils of
78
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government, with virtuous, independent statespersons who would govern as the framers
intended, in the public interest. Those who governed in the public interest, in turn, would adopt
a generous construction of national powers in order to fulfill constitutional commitments to an
improved citizenry. 79
The antislavery advocates who formed the Republican Party wholeheartedly adopted the
Jacksonian understanding of a legitimate political party, while substituting “the Slave Power” for
“the Money Power” as the central threat to constitutional politics and making the free people of
the North, later the people who remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War, as the rightful
sovereigns in the United States. Political organization was necessary because the Slave Power
rejected the fundamental majoritarian commitments of the Constitution. Slaveholders governed
the south undemocratically and controlled the national government only because a combination
of this undemocratic rule at home, the three-fifths clause, northerners bent on receiving spoils
and various other schemes inimical to popular government had generated a constitutional politics
that privileged southern interests. Slaveholders in control of the national government, in turn,
warped the original constitutional commitment to restraining the spread of slavery. Every good
Republican connected the procedural and substantive dots that held the Slave Power together. If
through organization the Republican Party restored the original constitutional commitment to
majority rule, they were convinced, then that procedural success would result in a constitutional
politics that again privileged the original antislavery commitments of the constitutional order.

2. Constitutional Authority in the Partisan Regime
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The partisan theory of constitutional authority that Van Buren developed and Lincoln
advanced in his first inaugural diverged from the antipartisan theory of constitutional authority
that Jefferson championed and made famous. Although Jefferson and Lincoln’s works are
commonly cited as the canonical expressions of departmentalism, 80 their challenges to judicial
theory were rooted in different conceptions of constitutional politics. Jefferson was a
departmentalist. His theory of constitutional authority was rooted in the Madisonian
understanding that liberty was best preserved by constitutional arrangements that enabled
different governmental institutions to check each other. Lincoln was not a departmentalist. His
theory of constitutional authority was rooted in the Van Burenite understanding that liberty was
best preserved by constitutional arrangements that enabled the legitimate party of the people to
control the entire government.
The Constitution of 1789 sought to privilege the public interest and minority rights
through institutional arrangements that guaranteed the independence of distinctive governing
institutions. Madison in Federalist 51 maintained that constitutional commitments could be
secured only if each branch of national government had the capacity to resist the other branches.
“The several constituent parts” of the federal government, he wrote, must have “the means of
keeping each other in their proper places.” 81 In his view, national power would be limited in
practice only if the Constitution was designed so “that each department should have a will of its
own.” 82 Jefferson was as committed to the separation of powers as the bulwark of freedom. His
Notes on the State of Virginia criticized the new Constitution of Virginia because “all the powers
of government, legislative, executive, and the judiciary result to the legislative body.” In his
view, “The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic
80
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government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands,
and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive
as one.” 83
Fragmenting political power was crucial to the founding effort to prevent the rise of
political parties, which they believed would undermine vital constitutional commitments. Both
Madison and Jefferson celebrated the separation of powers in part because they believed
completion between balanced government institutions for power would inhibit competition
between political parties for power. 84 Madison thought large republics promoted liberty by
inhibiting cooperation between potential members of a faction. 85
Jefferson and Madison opposed judicial supremacy because they believed a judicial
monopoly violated the institutional independence they thought vital for security republican
liberty. Both relied extensively on separation of powers logic when defending departmentalism.
Jefferson informed Abigail Adams:
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of the
sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to decide for
the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magistracies
are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. The judges,
believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and
imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the Constitution.
But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit
the execution of it; because that power has been confided to him by the
Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be
checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide
what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their own
sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive also, in their spheres, would
make the judiciary a despotic branch. 86
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Madison’s departmentalism was similarly yoked to the separation of powers. Responding to
suggestions during the First Congress to refer questions about the power of the president to
cashier cabinet members to the Supreme Court, Madison declared,
I beg to know, upon what principle it can be contended, that any one department
draws from the constitution greater powers than another, in marking out the limits
of the powers of the several departments. The constitution is the charter of the
people to the government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted,
and marks out the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of
either be brought into question, I do not see that any one of these independent
departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that
point. 87
Constitutional authority, for Jefferson and Madison, was rooted in office-holding rather
than elections. Members of Congress, the president and Supreme Court justices had the right to
interpret the Constitution independently because their offices were designed to be independent.
Elections played, at most, a secondary role in the means by which constitutional disputes were
resolved. Jefferson did observe that “when the legislative or executive functionaries act
unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity.” 88 Nevertheless,
Jefferson when defending departmentalism never claimed that an official had constitutional
authority because that official was elected and, hence, might be trusted to act consistently with
popular interpretations of constitutional provisions. Madison explicitly rejected popular
constitutionalism. After declaring in Federalist 49 that “The several departments being perfectly
coordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evidence, can pretend
to an exclusive or superior right to settling the boundaries between their respective powers,” he
promptly raised “insuperable objections against . . . recurrence to the people” as the appropriate
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means for resolving constitutional controversies between the different branches of the national
government. 89
Martin Van Buren accepted some elements of the separation of powers logic underlying
the Madisonian understanding of constitutional politics. His analysis of constitutional authority
in his Inquiry into the Origins and Course of Political Parties in the United States began by
endorsing Jefferson’s conception of departmentalism. 90 After quoting Jefferson at length, Van
Buren argued that President Andrew Jackson’s famous message vetoing the national bank bill 91
had justified presidential authority to interpret the Constitution on classical separation of powers
logic. Van Buren maintained that Jackson’s message asserted the following core propositions of
departmentalism:
That the Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by
its own opinions of the Constitution. . . . That the opinion of the judges has no
more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges,
and that on that point the President is independent of both. . . That the authority
of the Supreme Court should not therefore be permitted to control the Congress or
the Executive, when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. 92
Other passages of the Inquiry repeated this Jeffersonian departmentalist understanding of
constitutional authority. Van Buren asserted, “The provisions of the Constitution will be
searched in vain for any which indicate a design on the part of its framers to give to one of the
departments power to control the action of another in respect to its departmental duties under that
instrument.” 93
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Van Buren broke from Jefferson and Madison when discussing the role parties and
elections played resolving constitutional disputes between the different branches of the national
government. Madison and Jefferson assumed that government could function when the
legislature, executive and judiciary acted on distinctive constitutional understandings. Van
Buren insisted these disputes be resolved and that popular majorities were the ultimate
constitutional decision makers when governing officials could not settle constitutional
controversies. “The true view of the Constitution,” he declared, was
If different interpretations are put upon the Constitution by the different
departments, the people is the tribunal to settle the dispute. Each of the
departments is the agent of the people, doing their business according to the
powers conferred; and where there is a disagreement as to the extent of these
powers, the people themselves, through the ballot-boxes, must settle it. 94
More so than Jefferson or Madison, Van Buren emphasized that judicial supremacy was
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to majoritarianism. Placing constitutional
authority “under the supervision” of federal courts, he stated, “is nothing less than to divest the
Government of its republican features and to substitute in its place the control of an irresponsible
judicial oligarchy—to make the Constitution a lie, and turn to mockery its most formal
provisions, designed to secure to the people a control over the action of the Government under its
authority.” 95
Lincoln’s discussions of constitutional authority in his debates with Douglas and first
inaugural relied entirely on party, cutting out all references to the separation of powers. His
challenge to judicial authority in 1858 was issued as a member of the Republican Party, not as an
office holder or potential holder of a particular federal office. Lincoln’s analysis of
constitutional authority in his sixth debate with Stephen Douglas occurred during when he
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discussed the “principles” 96 of the Republican Party. Speaking as a member of the Republican
Party, he stated,
We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps
to address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been
decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob will decide him to be free. We do
not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that
court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus
settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall
be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be
binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that
does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to
be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the
foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil,
but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the States themselves. We
propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule
established upon this subject. 97
This passage defends the right of Republican Party members to campaign on a platform
committed to prohibiting slavery in the territories and act on that platform if elected to office.
While Lincoln spoke about members of Congress and the President exercising independent
judgment on constitutional questions, that independence stemmed from their status as elected
officials rather than holders of a particular office. At no point when campaigning for the Senate
or presidency did Lincoln invoke separation of powers logic as justifying congressional or
executive challenges to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott. His Republican Party was
organized for the purpose of making their contrary constitutional vision the law of the land by
controlling all three branches of government, thus obviating separation of powers as a
meaningful constraint on national authority or conception for thinking about constitutional
authority.
Lincoln’s analysis of constitutional authority in the Lincoln-Douglas debates was
consistent with the Republican critique of Dred Scott as an instance of constitutional
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partisanship. Republicans rarely criticized Dred Scott for being countermajoritarian. 98 Instead,
antislavery advocates sought to link the judicial decision that slavery could not be banned in
American territories with the Slave Power and northern doughfaces. The antislavery New York
Herald, when commenting on Dred Scott asserted, “At present, the South is strongly fortified. It
has the administration, both houses of Congress and the Supreme Court as its constitutional
defenses.” 99 Lincoln connected the Jacksonian majority in the federal judiciary with the
Jacksonian majority in the elected branches of the national government. “The Dred Scott
decision,” he asserted, “never would have been made in its present form if the party that made it
had not been sustained previously by the elections.” 100 Republicans who regarded Dred Scott as
a consequence of Slave Power control of the national government thought pointless the
Jeffersonian commitment to having each branch of the national government exercise independent
constitutional authority. If, as Lincoln declared, “James” Buchanan, “Roger” Taney, and
“Stephen” Douglas were involved in a conspiracy to pervert the constitutional commitment to
the end of slavery, 101 adjusting the allocation of constitutional authority would change nothing.
Instead, antislavery advocates claimed that persons committed to reversing Dred Scott should
attempt to replace Democratic Party officials in all three branches of the national government
with members of the Republican Party. Lincoln’s speech during the fifth debate with Douglas
endorsed Van Buren’s understanding that majority rule was the means by which constitutional
disputes were appropriately settled. He stated, “My own opinion is, that the new Dred Scott
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decision, deciding against the right of the people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be
made, if that party is not sustained by the elections.” 102
Lincoln’s first inaugural address built on his previous commitments to party as the main
vehicle of constitutional authority. That speech began by noting that the Constitution did not
explicitly resolve certain questions, most notably questions about the constitutional status of
slavery in the territories. Lincoln then observed that Americans formed parties when attempting
to gain favorable resolution of these open constitutional questions. “From questions of this class
spring all our constitutional controversies,” he asserted, “and we divide upon them into
majorities and minorities.” After articulating the constitutional mission of political parties,
Lincoln insisted on majority rule as the proper means for resolving constitutional disputes.
Lincoln made no reference to the power of the president or the right of any person holding a
particular government office to challenge Supreme Court decisions or engage in independent
constitutional decision-making. Constitutional authority rested in the hands of the majority
party. Lincoln’s first inaugural asserted:
A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limitations, and always
changing easily, with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is
the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly
to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a
permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissable; so that, rejecting the majority
principle, anarchy, or despotism in some form, is all that is left.
Lincoln’s famous attack on judicial supremacy came immediately after he insisted that
popular majorities were the ultimate constitutional authority in the United States. Dred Scott did
not permanently settle the constitutional status of slavery in the territories because “the candid
citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
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made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to
be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands
of that eminent tribunal.” Following Van Buren, Lincoln in his first inaugural referred to “the
people” as the ultimate constitutional authority. At no point in his debates with Douglas, in his
first inaugural, or in any other public remark delivered previous to the First Inaugural, did
Lincoln claim that Article II or the constitutional separation of powers justified an executive
decision to act inconsistently with the principles underlying the judicial decision in Dred Scott.
Lincoln, if elected Senator or President, was constitutionally authorized to support bans on
slavery in American territories because he was a member of the majority party that had gained
office campaigning on a platform dedicated to the principle that national officials had the
constitutional power and the constitutional obligation to ban slavery in the territories.
The theory of constitutional authority Lincoln articulated in the first inaugural and
debates with Douglas differed sharply from that espoused by Jefferson and Madison. Lincoln
believed constitutional authority vested in the party of the people, while Jefferson and Madison
maintained that constitutional authority was vested in governing institutions. Elections played a
far more crucial role in Lincoln’s understanding of constitutional authority than in Jefferson’s
departmentalism. Jefferson maintained that he had a right to independent constitutional authority
solely because he was president. His departmentalist conception of constitutional authority was
rooted in the framing understanding that elections were about electing the best men for public
office rather than making fundamental policy choices. 103 When justifying his decision to pardon
persons convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts, Jefferson never claimed authority to do so
because he and other Democratic-Republicans in 1800 had successfully campaigned on a
platform committed to repealing Federalist restrictions on free speech. By comparison, elections
103
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are at the center of the theory of constitutional authority Lincoln inherited from Van Buren.
Andrew Jackson when claiming constitutional authority to remove deposits from the national
bank emphasized that his constitutional opposition to the national bank had been sustained by
popular majorities in the 1832 Presidential election. 104 Lincoln similarly insisted that
Republicans were constitutionally authorized to ban slavery in the territories because they had
campaigned on that issue and won the 1860 national election. Justifying his decision not to
abandon campaign pledges to restrict the expansion of slavery, Lincoln stated, “when ballots
have fairly, and constitutionally, decided, there can be no successful appeal, back to bullets;
that there can be no successful appeal, except to ballots themselves, at succeeding elections.” 105
“Electoral winners, Lincoln and Andrew Jackson agreed, were constitutionally authorized to
interpret the Constitution consistently with their advertised constitutional vision.
These differences between Lincoln and Jefferson help explain why the first inaugural
does not neatly map on to a theory of judicial supremacy, of departmentalism, or of any other
contemporary model of constitutional authority. These common theories of constitutional
authority are all grounded in claims that the separation of powers is vital for the maintenance of
liberty. 106 Proponents of departmentalism, legislative supremacy, judicial supremacy, and
compact theory assign distinctive functions to the different branches of the national government.
They debate what balance of constitutional authority best maintains these distinctive functions,
so that a separation of powers system may promote constitutional commitments and uphold
constitutional restrictions. 107 Mid-Nineteenth century Americans who defended partisan
supremacy believed that constitutional commitments were best secured when the legitimate party
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of the people gained control of all three branches of the national government. Effective
constitutional politics required coordination between party members in different branches of the
national government rather than sharp functional separation. Little need existed for serious
thinking about how to allocate constitutional authority between governing institutions in a
system in which the President, judicial majority, and majority in both Houses of Congress shared
a common constitutional vision. Van Buren and other partisans tended to be very pragmatic
when disputes arose between different institutions controlled by different parties, more often
defending the particular institution their party controlled than advocating a general theory of
constitutional authority. 108 One consequence of this emphasis on party as the vehicle for
resolving constitutional disputes is that Republicans in general and Abraham Lincoln in
particular had no well thought out theory of the separation of powers when Republicans gained
control of the elected branches of the national government in 1860. 109 The theory of
constitutional authority Lincoln advanced in his debates with Douglas and during the First
Inaugural was designed to explain why Republicans in power could challenge constitutional
decisions previously made by the Supreme Court. As of March 5, 1861, Lincoln had said
nothing about the allocation of constitutional authority when Republicans in different branches
of the national government disputed the meaning of some constitutional provision.
Committed to the legitimate party of the people as the institution responsible for
resolving constitutional disputes, Republicans immediately after the Civil War were more
concerned with which party controlled the meaning of existing enumerated powers, rights, and
restrictions than with resolving controversies of the meaning of the Constitution of 1865.
Republicans in both 1860 and in 1865 recognized that intra-party disputes existed over the
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constitutional status of persons of color. The main goal of the Republican Party in the late 1850s
was to find a way within the structure of existing constitutional politics to ensure that popular
majorities, rather than an oligarchic Slave Power, resolved those disputes. The main goal of the
Republican Party in 1865 was to construct a constitutional politics that made sure that disputes
over the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment were decided by the persons who remained loyal
during the Civil War rather than traitors and copperheads.

B. Two Threats

The Republican Party when the Thirty-Ninth Congress met confronted two potential
threats to their constitutional commitment to a broad interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The first possible threat was that Republicans lacked the constitutional authority to
combat a southern resurgence. In this view, championed by John Bingham, the Constitution
needed amendment in order to provide Congress with the legal power necessary to prevent
persons of color in the South from being practically enslaved and to protect southern Unionists
from gross rights violations. The second possible threat was that Republicans lacked the
political strength necessary to combat a southern resurgence. In this view, championed by
Thaddeus Stevens, the Constitution needed amendment to prevent a revived Slave Power from
regaining control of the elected branches of the national government and then repealing the
constitutional legislation Republicans had passed that prevented persons of color in the south
from being practically enslaved and protected the rights of southern Unionists.

1. John Bingham’s Perceived Threat
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Bingham maintained that Republicans majorities in Congress lacked the legal authority to
prevent the South from practically reenslaving persons of color. When opposing the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, Bingham declared, “The Constitution does not delegate to the United States the
power to punish offenses against the life, liberty or property of the citizen in the States, nor does
it prohibit that power to the States, to be by them exercised.” In his view, “The prohibitions of
power by the Constitution to the States are express prohibitions, as that no State shall enter into
any treaty, &c., or emit bills of credit, or pass any bill of attainder, &c.”
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Democrats, who opposed on the merits laws granting rights to freed slaves, Bingham emphasized
that he personally favored providing substantial legal protections to persons of color. His
objection to the Civil Rights Act went solely to the constitutionality of the bill, not to the policies
being enacted. He informed follow members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
The law in every State should be just; it should be no respecter of persons. It is
otherwise now, and it has been otherwise for many years in many of the States of
the Union. I should remedy that not by an arbitrary assumption of power, but by
amending the Constitution of the United States, expressly prohibiting the States
from any such abuse of power in the future. 111
Until a constitutional amendment added the relevant enumerated powers, rights and restrictions,
Bingham maintained, Congress had no legal authority to interfere when former Confederate
states enacted Black Codes and otherwise sought to restore the antebellum status quo within their
jurisdictions. Bingham during the debates over the stand-alone version of Section 2 announced
he would “tremble for the future of my country,” unless Congress passed “another general
amendment to the Constitution which looks to the grant of express power to the Congress of the
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United States to enforce in behalf of every citizen of every State and every Territory in the Union
the rights which were guarantied to him from the beginning.” 112
Bingham stood almost alone in both the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and in
Congress when he repeatedly insisted that Republicans lacked the constitutional authority to
implement their constitutional commitment to “the absolute equality of all citizens of the United
States politically and civilly before the law.” 113 His fellow Republicans in Thirty-Ninth
Congress, almost unanimously, believed that the Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional
prohibitions vested Congress with more than adequate legal powers to combat racial
discrimination and rights violations in the postwar South. Congressional majorities in the House
and Senate while the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated first passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and then reenacted the bill over President Johnson’s veto. That measure declared
persons of color to be citizens of the United States and guaranteed that those persons would
enjoy “the same rights as white persons” in the civil and criminal law. 114 Conservative
Republicans when defending the constitutionality of these new legal rights and restrictions on
state power interpreted broadly the rights and congressional powers to protect those rights
enumerated by the Thirteenth Amendment. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois maintained
[U]nder the constitutional amendment which we have now adopted, and which
declares that slavery shall no longer exist, and which authorizes Congress by
appropriate legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we have a
right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is deemed appropriate, and which
will accomplish the end in view, secure freedom to all people in the United States.
The various State laws to which I have referred—and there are many others—
although they do not make a man an absolute slave, yet deprive him of the rights
of a freeman; and it is perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where
freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not allow a colored person
to go from one county to another is certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a
freeman. A law that does not allow a colored person to hold property, does not
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allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is certainly a law in violation of
the rights of a freeman, and being so may properly be declared void. 115
Many Radical Republicans interpreted the Constitution of December 1865 as
empowering the national government to protect political, as well as civil rights. Charles Sumner
and others insisted that some combination of the Thirteenth Amendment, the guarantee clause of
Article IV, and the congressional power to regulate federal elections authorized Congress to
prohibit racial discrimination in voting. Sumner during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of
1866 stated,
Beyond all question, the protection of the colored race in civil rights is essential to
complete the abolition of Slavery; but the protection of the colored race in
political rights is not less essential, and the power is as ample in one case as in the
other. In each you legislate for the maintenance of that Liberty so tardily
accorded, and the legislation is just as "appropriate" in one case as in the other.
Protection in civil rights by Act of Congress will be a great event. It will be great
in itself. It will be greater still, because it establishes the power of Congress,
without further amendment of the National Constitution, to protect every citizen
in all his rights, including of course the elective franchise. 116
Bingham endorsed this conclusion. Although he denied that the Thirteenth Amendment
empowered Congress to pass legislation protecting civil or political rights, Bingham thought two
provisions in the Constitution of 1789, the guarantee clause and the elections clause, enabled
Congress to pass legislation enfranchising persons of color. 117
Republicans were internally divided other whether the Constitution before or after the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment permitted Congress to grant political rights to persons
of color. Radicals insisted that Congress had the right and duty to enfranchise persons of color.
Moderate and conservative Republicans disagreed. Although most insisted that the Constitution
vested Congress with the power to protect the civil rights of former slaves and southern
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Unionists, many denied that the Constitution vested Congress with the power to enfranchise any
one. Fessenden, the chair of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, declared, “the States have,
as the Constitution stands today, the perfect right to fix the qualifications of voters.” 118 Bingham
appears to be the only member of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who thought Congress in December
1865 had the power to protect political rights, but not civil rights.
Politics and policy considerations, however, loomed larger than constitutional concerns
when members of the 39th Congress rejected legislation and constitutional amendments
enfranchising persons of color. Crucial Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
believed that neither legislation nor a constitutional amendment prohibiting racial discrimination
in voting was timely or appropriate. Some opposed black suffrage on the merits. 119 Others
insisted a constitutional amendment prohibiting racial discrimination in voting could not be
passed. Senator Williams spoke for a crucial bloc of Republican Senators when he declared,
“the evidence before our eyes that the people of these United States are not prepared to surrender
to Congress the absolute right to determine as to the qualifications of voters in the respective
States, or to adopt the proposition that all persons, without distinction of race or color, shall
enjoy political rights and privileges equal to those now possessed by the white people of the
country.” 120
Had Republicans the will to enfranchise persons of color throughout the United States,
most would have found the constitutional way. When members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
debated questions of congressional power, constitutional opinions lined up neatly with policy
preferences. With the prominent exception of Senator John Henderson of Missouri, 121 those
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Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who favored legislation granting voting rights
to persons of color also believed the Constitution permitted Congress to pass legislation granting
voting rights to persons of color. Bingham on civil rights and Henderson on political rights
aside, no Republican in 1866 perceived that a constitutional constraint on congressional power to
provide what they believed were adequate or, at least, politically feasible legal protections to
persons of color in the South. At most, as one legal historian states, “some residual doubt”
remained as to the scope of federal power under the Thirteenth Amendment. 122
Republicans were aware that Democrats did not believe Congress had much power under
the Thirteenth Amendment or other constitutional provisions to protect persons of color in the
South. Andrew Johnson spoke for virtually all Democrats when he vetoed both the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill as unconstitutional. His veto of the Civil
Rights Act declared,
It cannot . . . be justly claimed that, with a view to the enforcement of [the
Thirteenth Amendment], there is at present any necessity for the exercise of all
the powers which this bill confers. Slavery has been abolished, and at present
nowhere exists within the jurisdiction of the United States; nor has there been, nor
is it likely there will be, any attempt to revive it by the people or the States. If,
however, any such attempt shall be made, it will then become the duty of the
General Government to exercise any and all incidental powers necessary and
proper to maintain inviolate this great constitutional law of freedom. 123
Still, Republicans in December 1865 were not confronting the problems that would result when a
Democrats in control of the national government had the power to control the meaning of the
Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions that the party of the people who
remained loyal during the Civil War intended to secure freedom and equality under law.
Democratic understandings of the Thirteenth Amendment did not matter as long as Republicans
were united and Democrats the minority party. The issue that occupied most Republicans when
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the Thirty-Ninth Congress met was what could be done to modify those constitutional provisions
that might nable a revived Democratic/Slave Power coalition to reassert control over the
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and other provisions that the party of the people who
remained loyal during the Civil War intended to secure freedom and equality under law.

2. Thaddeus Stevens’s Perceived Threat
The Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress had good reason to believe that
postwar constitutional politics might transform the Thirteenth Amendment into a parchment
barrier in much the same way that antebellum constitutional politics, as manifested most notably
by the Dred Scott decision and Kansas-Nebraska Act, had perverted what they perceived to be
the antislavery commitments of the original Constitution. Republicans regularly heard reports
from the South detailing how former slaveowners planned to dominate the country by renewing
their previous alliances with Northern Democrats. This alliance, if successfully consummated,
would enable former Confederates to make the Thirteenth Amendment a dead letter and
otherwise prevent Union states from enjoying the fruits of their battlefield victory. Republicans
learned to their horror that they had inadvertently empowered this conspiracy when ratifying the
constitutional ban on slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment, by gutting the three-fifths clause of
the Constitution, threatened to undermine the constitutional politics necessary to make the
Thirteenth Amendment a living reality.
Republicans shortly after ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment were deluged by on-the
ground bulletins from sympathetic journalists about how the Slave Power intended to win in the
peace what was lost in the war. Northern reporters who toured the South, Garrett Epps details,
observed that “the Slave South, though vanquished, was unbowed, and . . . its people intended to
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recreate its prewar system as closely as they could, and then return to dominate the Union.” 124
Prominent Southerners when interviewed made such claims as “We’ll unite with the opposition
up North, and between us we’ll make a majority. Then we’ll show you who’s going to govern
this country.” 125 Southern elites expected that this revived coalition of former slaveholders and
Northern Democrats in office would repudiate the debt the United States incurred when fighting
the Civil War, or at least exempt southerners from paying the taxes needed to service that debt,
assume slave state government debts incurred during the Civil War, compensate southerners for
emancipated slaves, restrict speech critical of southern practices, and, most important, develop a
labor system similar to slavery that would maintain white supremacy. Carl Schurz, who was sent
south on a fact-finding mission by President Johnson, noted a southern “desire to preserve
slavery in its original form as much and as long as possible . . . or to introduce into the new
system that element of physical compulsion which would make the negro work.” This revised
system of labor, Schurz declared, would be “intermediate between slavery as it formerly existed
in the South, and free labor as it exists in the North, but more nearly related to the former than
the latter.”
Northern journalists observed that slaveholders and their potential Northern Democratic
coalition partners were celebrating one unanticipated consequence of the Thirteenth Amendment,
a consequence that threatened to structure a constitutional politics that privileged a revived Slave
Power’s efforts to nullify in practice, if not as a matter of fundamental law, the constitutional ban
on slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment repealed the three-fifths clause of Article I. Antebellum
northerners had railed against this provision as the primary means by which an undemocratic
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Slave Power ruled the country. 126 The additional votes that slave states gained because slaves
were counted as three-fifths of person when allocating seats in the House of Representations and
members of the Electoral College provided the margin of difference in the presidential election
of 1800, on the congressional vote on the Kansas-Nebraska Act and on other matters on which
antebellum Americans were divided by section. Republicans before the Civil War insisted that
enslaved persons of color ought not be counted at all when allocating seats in the House of
Representatives and members of the Electoral College. Former slaveholders after the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, recognized that disenfranchised persons of
color now counted as full persons when allocating seats in the House of Representations and
members of the Electoral College. Instead of losing representation and political power, as
antislavery advocates had demanded, the Thirteenth Amendment promised to increase southern
influence on national policy. This boost to white southern political power, in their view, might be
sufficient to enable the former slave states to regain control over the national government. The
Richmond Examiner summarized these southern hopes when asserting,
Universal assent appears to be given to the proposition that if the States lately
rebellious be restored to rights of representation according to the federal basis, or
to the basis of numbers enlarged by the enumeration of all the blacks in the next
census, the political power of the country will pass into the hands of the South,
aided it will be, by Northern alliances.” 127
The threat Republicans faced in December 1865 was that, on the near certain assumption
that southern states would not allow persons of color to vote, the Thirteenth Amendment, by
requiring that southern blacks count as full persons for representational purposes, significantly
augmented the power of southern whites to control the meaning of any enumerated constitutional
right and determine the exercise of any enumerated power designed to implement the
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constitutional commitment to equality under law. Robert Dale Owen informed President
Johnson,
By the constitution the representative population is to consist of all free persons
and three-fifths of all other persons. If, by next winter, slavery shall have
disappeared, there will be no "other persons” in the South. Her actual population
will then coincide with her representative population. She will have gained, as to
Federal representation, 1,600,000 persons. She will be entitled, not as now to
eighty-four members, but to ninety-four; and her votes for President will be in
proportion; Congress, if it intends that the Constitutional rule shall prevail, will
have to alter the apportionment so as to correspond to the new order of things.
Now, if the negro is admitted to vote, the constitutional rule will operate justly;
for then each voter in the South will have precisely the same political influence as
a voter in the North. The unjust three-fifths principle will have disappeared
forever. On the other hand, if color be deemed cause of exclusion, then all the
political power which is withheld from the emancipated slave is gained by the
Southern white if freed slaves were denied the ballot, each Southern white voter
would exercise three times the political power of a Northern voter. 128
Instead of having an 18 vote bonus in the House of Representatives and Electoral College, as
was the case before the Civil War,Republicans estimated that the Thirteenth Amendment gave
southern whites a thirty vote bonus in their quest to regain control of the national government. 129
Thaddeus Stevens and other Republican leaders lived in fear that the South would rise
again. They repeatedly asserted that the Thirteenth Amendment was likely to become a
parchment barrier and Appomattox a hollow victory if constitutional politics, as transformed by
the Thirteenth Amendment, was not immediately reconstructed. Stevens when introducing the
first version of the Fourteenth Amendment warned the Republican majority in the House of
Representatives that
With the basis unchanged, the eighty-three southern members, with the
Democrats that will in the best times be elected from the North, will always give
them a majority in Congress and in the Electoral College. They will at the very
first election take possession of the White House and the halls of Congress. I
need not depict the ruin that would follow. Assumption of the rebel debt or
128

“Letter from Robert Dale Owen: Negro Suffrage and Representative Population,” New York Tribune, June 24,
1865, p. 8.
129
See generally, Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment, p. 46.

59
repudiation of the Federal debt would follow. The oppression of the freedmen;
the reamendment of their State constitutions, and the reestablishment of slavery
would be the inevitable result. 130
Representative John Thomas of Maryland agreed that the constitutional politics necessary to
enforce Republican constitutional commitments was in jeopardy. He observed that southerners
“have the determination to seize hold of the political power, and to use it if possible to punish
those who have made them submit to the laws.” 131
Stevens and other Republicans bluntly maintained that constitutional change was
necessary to preserve the Republican Party. A constitutional amendment was needed, Stevens
stated, “to secure perpetual ascendancy to the party of the Union; and so as to render our
republican Government firm and stable forever.” 132 Other Republicans were as direct. In a
speech celebrating partisanship, Representative Samuel McKee of Kentucky declared, “I would
like so to amend the Constitution that no man who had raised his arm against the flag should ever
be allowed to participate in any of the affairs of the Government.” 133 Senator Henry Wilson of
Massachusetts waxed eloquent on the need for constitutional change that entrenched the party of
Union. His speech on March 2, 1866 asserted,
Mr. President, the House, the Senate, the Cabinet, the President, each and all
should not now forget to remember that they were clothed with authority by a
party inspired by patriotism and liberty, a party that proclaims as its living faith
the sublime creed of the equal rights of man and the brotherhood of all humanity,
embodied in the New Testament and the Declaration of Independence. Let
Representatives, Senators, Cabinet ministers, and the President amid the trials and
temptations of the present, fully realize that the great Republican party, embracing
in its ranks more of moral and intellectual worth than was ever embodied in any
political organization in any age or in any land, was created by no man or set of
men, that it was brought into being by Almighty God to represent the higher and
better sentiments of Christian America, to bear the flag of patriotism and liberty,
of justice and humanity. Brought into being in 1854 to resist the repeal of the
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prohibition of slavery in Kansas and Nebraska, the further expansion of slavery
into the depths of the continent, and the longer domination of the slaver power, it
has for twelve years, in defeat and in victory, ever been true to country, ever
faithful to its flag, ever devoted to the rights of struggling humanity. No political
party in any country or in any age has fought on a plain so lofty, or achieved so
much for country, republican institutions, the cause of freedom, of justice, and of
Christian civilization. If it should perish now in the pride of strength and of
power, by the hands of suicide, or by the follies or treacheries of men it has
generously trusted, it will leave to after times a brilliant record of honor and of
glory. The enduring interests of the regenerated nation, the rights of man, and the
elevation of an emancipated race alike demand that the great Union Republican
party, the outgrowth and development of advancing civilization in America, shall
continue to administer the Government it preserved, and frame the laws for the
nation it saved. 134
Republican journalists agreed. The Springfield Republican asserted that Republican Party had a
“duty . . . to retain power as long as it can by honorable means, for the good of the country.” 135
Virtually every Republican speech on various proposed Fourteenth Amendments
emphasized the need to combat the threat of a revived Slave Power, augmented by the extra
representation gained by the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the implicit repeal of
the three-fifths clause. Many spoke of the specific threat to the Republican Party. 136 Others
emphasized the way in which an augmented representation from the south would threaten the
both the constitutional commitment to equality under law and the national economy.
Representative Rufus Spaulding of Ohio worried that the a Democratic Party majority,
augmented by the Thirteenth Amendment would “repeal many, if not all, of the measures which
we have adopted for the welfare and salvation of the country.” 137 Representative George
Boutwell of Massachusetts claimed that maintaining the existing ratio of representation “would
portent the destruction of the public credit, the repudiation of the public debt, and the
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disorganization of society?” 138 Still others focused on the inequities and incongruities of a
system in which voters in the south gained political power as a result their defeat in the civil war.
Senator John Sherman of Ohio spoke of the “anomaly of allowing the rebel States an increased
political power in Congress.” 139 “I would not allow this additional number of ten
Representatives to the late slave States as the reward of treason,” Representative Lawrence of
Ohio declared. 140
The consistency with which Republicans expressed immediate concern with the structure
of constitutional politics contrasts sharply with their attitude toward the state of constitutional
law. Republicans who disagreed over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that included only a
version of Section 2 agreed that unless the basis of representation changed, Republicans might
lack the political power necessary to implement the constitutional commitment to equality under
law. 141 John Bingham was the only participant in the brief debate over the stand-alone version
of what became Section 1 who claimed that Republicans in power lacked the legal authority
necessary to implement that constitutional commitment. When the Joint Committee combined
into an omnibus constitutional amendment proposals to enumerated additional rights and powers
and proposals to alter the structure of constitutional politics, Republican speeches on the floor of
Congress continued to focus almost exclusively on threats to Republican political hegemony. 142
As noted above, Republicans in 1866 thought that the Constitution “as it was” placed few legal
barriers on the capacity of a political coalition committed to equality under law to reconstruct the
south. Bingham was performing solos when he gave speeches declaring that Republicans lacked
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the legal power to reconstruct the south, while ignoring the possibility that in the very near future
Republicans might not have the political power to reconstruct the south.

IV. The Rise and Partial Fall of Thaddeus Steven’s Fourteenth Amendment

Thaddeus Stevens won the immediate battle over the thrust of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but lost both the war over how the Fourteenth Amendment would weaken the Slave
Power and the longer struggle over how the Fourteenth Amendment would structure American
constitutional politics. As Stevens repeatedly demanded, Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress designed constitutional provisions that they believed would construct an American
constitutional politics able to parry the threat a revived Slave Power presented to the
implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Contrary to John Bingham’s concerns,
Republicans spent very little energy debating new enumerated powers and rights. Members of
the Thirty-Ninth Congress rarely broached the subject of judicial review, the primary means by
which legal constraints are enforced. Stevens was less successful controlling the precise means
by which Republicans reconstructed American constitutional politics. Instead of provisions
enfranchising persons of color and disfranchising disloyal southerners, the final version of the
Fourteenth Amendment merely imposed a weakened penalty for states that disfranchised male
voters for any reason and forbade some former confederates from holding government office.
The end result was a Fourteenth Amendment Stevens doubted would protect either persons of
color or the Republican majority.
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A. Reconstructing Constitutional Politics

Stevens set out the vital importance of reconstructing American politics in his speech
introducing the Joint Committee’s first proposed Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment that included only a version of what eventually became Section 2. 143 As noted
above, Stevens insisted that a constitutional amendment was necessary to “secure perpetual
ascendancy to the party of the Union; and so render our Republican Government firm and stable
forever.” Such dire consequences as “the repudiation of the Federal debt” and the
“reestablishment of slavery,” he opined, would “be the inevitable result” of a constitutional
politics played under the rules mandated in 1789. The Joint Committee’s proposal to penalize
severely states that disfranchised persons of color would prevent these outcomes. Former slave
states seeking the political power necessary to influence national policy would face a dilemma.
Stevens asserted,
If they should grant the right of suffrage to persons of color, I think there would
always be Union white men enough in the South, aided by the blacks, to divide
the representation, and thus continue the Republican ascendency. If they should
refuse to thus alter their election laws it would reduce the representatives of the
late slave States to about forty-five and render them powerless for evil.
Stevens endorsed additional constitutional revisions in the pipeline that were more concerned
with constraining than with reconstructing constitutional politics. He informed Congress,
“Other proposed amendments—to make all laws uniform; to prohibit the assumption of the rebel
debt—are of vital importance, and the only thing that can prevent the combined forces of
copperheads and secessionists from legislating against the interests of the Union whenever they
may obtain an accidental majority.” 144 Nevertheless, throughout the debate over various
143
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versions of the Fourteenth Amendment, Stevens repeatedly asserted the primacy of those
provisions that promised to construct a favorable constitutional politics rather than centrality of
provisions that directly made better constitutional law.
Stevens made his preference for reconstructing constitutional politics clear when
introducing and defending the omnibus constitutional amendment that the Joint Committee
proposed in the spring of 1866. His speech presenting the revised, five section, Fourteenth
Amendment to Congress stated, “The second section I consider the most important in the article.
. . . The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or
so shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the national
government.” 145 Immediately before that version of the Joint Committee’s handiwork was put to
a vote in the House of Representatives, Stevens gave a speech emphasizing how the clause that
disenfranchised former Confederates privileged both the constitutional commitment to equality
under law and the continued hegemony of the party committed to equality under law.
I should be worried to find that that provision was stricken out, because before
any portion of this can be put into operation there will be, if not a Herod, a worse
than Herod elsewhere to obstruct our actions. That side of the House will be
filled with yelling secessionists and hissing copperheads. Give us the third
section or give us nothing. Do not balk us with the pretense of an amendment
which throws the Union into the hands of the enemy before it becomes
consolidated.
Gentleman say I speak of party. Whenever party is necessary to sustain
the Union I say rally to your party and save the Union. I do not hesitate to say at
once, that section is there to save or destroy the Union by the salvation or
destruction of the Union party. 146
That speech also emphasized the importance of the proposed provision disenfranchising former
Confederates. “Without Section 3, it amounts to nothing,” Stevens stated. “I do not care the
snap of my finger whether [the Fourteenth Amendment] be passed or not if that be stricken
145
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out.” 147 Stevens in these discussions also praised what had become section 1. He referred to that
provision as “excellent.” 148 Nevertheless, Stevens thought that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment merely protected by constitutional amendment what Congress had already protected
when legitimately exercising its Thirteenth Amendment powers. 149 Section 1 was useful both as
a statement of principle and because the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was “repealable by a
majority,” 150 but Stevens continued to impress upon Congress that, unless constitutional politics
was reconstructed, a revived Slave Power was likely to horribly mistreat persons of color, no
matter what the textual constraints on state and national power. His last speech on the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment declared, “I see no hope of safety unless in the prescription of proper
enabling acts, which shall do justice to the freedmen and enjoin enfranchisement as a condition
precedent.” 151
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction shared Stevens’s priorities and concerns, even as
committee majorities often weakened his proposals. “The question uppermost in every mind,”
Fessenden’s son and biographer noted, “was the adjustment by constitutional amendment of the
basis of representation of the South in Congress.” 152 The Joint Committee’s report to Congress
placed particular emphasis on the pressing need to alter the way in which the Constitution
allocated political power in light of the implicit repeal of the three-fifths clause: “The increase of
representation necessarily resulting from the abolition of slavery,” Fessenden reported, “was
considered the most important element in the questions arising out of the changed condition of
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affairs, and the necessity for some fundamental action in this regard seemed imperative.” 153 The
first version of the Fourteenth Amendment the committee approved adjusted representation in
the House of Representatives and voting in the Electoral College and did not enumerate any new
powers or rights 154 As did Stevens, Joint Committee members favored adding explicit legal
constraints on government as well as reconstructing constitutional politics. Nevertheless,
nothing in the committee’s deliberations or report indicated that Section 1 or Section 5 as a
means for implementing only Section 1 occupied a particular place of pride. The final report of
the Joint Committee presented equality under law as one of many goals the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to secure.
The conclusion of your committee therefore is that the so-called Confederate
States are not, at present, entitled to representation in the Congress of the United
States; that before allowing such representation, adequate security for future
peace and safety should be required; that this can be found only in such changes
of the organic law as shall determine the civil rights and privileges of all citizens
in all parts of the republic, shall place representation on an equitable basis, shall
fix a stigma upon treason, and protect the loyal people against future claims for
the expenses incurred in support of rebellion and for manumitted slaves, together
with an express grant of power in Congress to enforce those provisions. 155
In sharp contrast to the fairly lengthy treatment the Report of the Joint Committee gave to the
threat a revived Slave Power presented to existing legal protections for persons of color, the
report documented no weaknesses in existing enumerated powers, rights, and restrictions that
needed constitutional correction. 156
Stevens and the Joint Committee set the tone for the debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment. Republican members of the House and Senate celebrated versions of Section 2
and, less often, Section 3 for their capacity to prevent disloyal southerners from influencing
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American constitutional politics. “One object I have in supporting this resolution,” Senator
George Williams of Oregon asserted, “is to deprive the rebel States . . . of as much power in
Congress as the Constitution and circumstances of the country demand and allow, so that the
men who saved the Union can provide lasting securities for the future integrity, honor, and peace
of the nation.” 157 Representative Francis Thomas of Maryland insisted that disloyal southerners
should not be allowed to participate in politics until their participation would have no political
impact. He informed other representatives, “I shall never consent that such men shall be
enfranchised till the foundation of this Government have been so firmly established as that no
man once tainted with treason can ever exert any influence in unsettling it.” 158
Many Republicans bluntly maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
construct a constitutional politics favorable to the Republican Party. “If we are a revolutionary
party,” Representative Robert Schenck of Ohio declared when defending an early version of
Section 2, “we are only revolutionary in the direction of freedom or equality.” 159 Republicans
when debating legislation or a constitutional amendment enfranchising persons of color openly
considered which policy best preserved Republican rule “The time may arrive when the
southern slaveholders and their northern sympathizers may come so near having the control of
the Government,” such proponents of enfranchising persons of color as Senator Richard Yates of
Illinois warned, “that the loyal black vote may be the balance of power and cast the scale in favor
of Union and liberty.” 160 Williams, who opposed black suffrage, stated “Put it before the
country and commit the Union party to it, the amendment will be defeated and the Union party
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overwhelmed in its support—and the control of this Government would pass into the hands of
men who have more or less sympathy with the rebellion.” 161
Proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment often connected more abstract notions of
political equality with partisan or sectional advantage. Their Section 2 was the means by which
the party of the legitimate majority of loyal voters would gain office and govern consistently
with the majoritarian commitments of the Constitution, and not a gerrymander that would
provide Republicans with more political power than their support among loyal voters warranted.
Representative William Kelley of Pennsylvania offered a variation on a very common theme
when he asked Democrats, “whether there is any reason that when our Government shall be
reconstructed, one pardoned rebel of South Carolina who may not be able to read and write, and
who may have fought for four years against the Government, shall in political power, alike on
the floor of Congress and in electing a President, outweigh three or five intelligent returned
soldiers of New Jersey, who throughout the same four years fought for the Union.” 162 Just as
Martin Van Buren’s Democrats believed that their legitimate party of the people would gain
office in a fair majoritarian election, 163 so Thaddeus Stevens’s Republicans thought that
structuring national elections (other than for the Senate) consistently with the principle one
person/one vote would be sufficient to thwart the ambitions of a revived Slave Power.
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio was one of many Republicans who emphasized that
Republicans, as the legitimate party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War, were
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merely seeking to construct a constitutional politics that would prevent an aristocratic faction
from exercising undue political power.
If this injustice can be tolerated and perpetuated, and the late rebel States shall
soon be admitted to representation, they will enjoy as the reward of their perfidy
and treason increased political power. This will reward traitors with a liberal
premium for treason. I am unwilling that this gross inequality should continue, so
that when the representative of South Carolina return to these Halls, each rebel
voter by them represented will enjoy a political power more than double that of
every loyal voter of my district.
Sir, I would not allow this additional number of ten Representatives to the
late slave States as the reward of treason. But I would strike down the political
power heretofore wielded by the eighteen Representatives of slavery, and make
the political power of every voter precisely equal all over the land. 164
“The question,” Representative Ithamar Sloan of Wisconsin asserted, is “whether we shall amend
the Constitution so as to make a loyal man at least equal to a disloyal one in political rights and
power.” 165
Members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress spent far more time discussing what became
Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment than they did commenting on Sections 1 or 5. 166
The debate over the first version of Fourteenth Amendment, the version that included only an
early draft of Section 2, took more than a month. The debate over the stand-alone version of
Section 1 took two days. Thaddeus Stevens did not even bother participating. When both
proposals were combined, Republicans on average devoted approximately five to ten times as
many words debating the sections on constitutional politics than the sections on constitutional
law. 167 Most important perhaps, Republicans expressed far more concern with the details of
Sections 2 and 3 than with the precise language or meaning of Sections 1 and 5.
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Antislavery advocates were determined to get the provisions on constitutional politics
“right.” If we measure a speech’s influence by citation counts, the speech Representative James
Blaine of Maine gave on January 8, 1866 was by a wide margin the most important and
influential address on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. That speech vigorously objected to
proposals to allocate seats in the House of Representatives by the number of voters in a state.
That ratio of representation was unsatisfactory and unfair, Blaine insisted, because the ratio of
voters to population was much higher in Western states than in New England. 168 Blaine’s
comments touched off a major dispute between Republicans in Congress over precisely how
post-Civil War constitutional politics should be reconstructed. “Western” Republicans fought
for allocating representation by voters. 169 New Englanders demanded that population be
maintained as the basis for representation. 170 Radicals insisted that persons of color be
enfranchised. 171
These matters and many more were carefully scrutinized and decisively resolved when
Republican minds were focused on the structure of constitutional politics. The issues relevant to
the precise language of Section 2 that Republicans debated for almost six months included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

168

Should the Constitution prohibit race discrimination in voting?
If not, should the basis for allocating seats in the House of Representatives be
voters or population?
Should representation continue to be tied to taxation, as was the case before the
Civil War?
Should states lose a proportion of their representation only if voters were denied
the ballot on the basis of race, or should other laws denying voting rights be
factored into the constitutional equation?
If a state denied some voters or some voters of color access to the ballot, should
the Constitution subtract all voters in the disenfranchised class from the basis of
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6.
7.

apportionment or merely the percentage of voters in the disenfranchised class
denied the ballot?
Should state decisions to enfranchise women factor into the representation
calculus?
If a state permitted some people to vote in some elections, but not others, which
elections mattered for the representation calculus?

The Thirty-Ninth Congress settled every one of these controversies over constitutional politics.
The final version of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include a provision enfranchising
persons of color, based representation on population, cut the tie between representation and
taxation, reduced state representation when any one was denied the ballot, reduced state
representation in proportion in which eligible men were denied the ballot, and used federal
elections as the basis for determining who was denied the franchise.
The persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment as carefully scrutinized the
language of Section 3 and as decisively resolved all disputes over how that provision should
reconstruct American constitutional politics. The issues Republicans debated at length included:
1. Should former Confederates be disenfranchised or merely denied the right to hold
office?
2. Which former Confederates should be disenfranchised or denied the right to hold
office?
3. Should the disability cover all offices, all federal offices, or specific federal offices?
4. Should the disability be permanent or have an end date?
5. Could the disability be removed and, if so, how?
All of these controversies were settle by June 1866. The final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not disenfranchise anyone, declared that Confederates who had previously held
federal or state offices were barred from holding all federal or state offices, and allowed that ban
to be removed only by a two-thirds vote from both Houses of Congress.
Section 1 and Section 5 were not nearly as carefully scrutinized and little attempt was
made to resolve seeming differences over their coverage. Section 1 is far less specific than
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Sections 2 and 3. 172 Published speeches in the Congressional Globe suggest no consensus
existed within the Republican Party over the precise scope of the rights enumerated in Section 1
or the powers enumerated in Section 5. Bingham and Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan
maintained that Section 1 gave Congress the power to enforce the Bill of Rights. Their speeches
should be given considerable weight, given that both were on the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction and Howard was the Senator who presented the omnibus Fourteenth Amendment
to the Senate. 173 Some congressmen maintained that Section 1 enshrined in the Constitution the
central principles of the Declaration of Independence. 174 Still others briefly declared that the
purpose of Section 1 was to remove all doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. 175 These seeming differences may have been resolved in closed-door meetings of the
Republican caucus, but they were not publicly settled. As William Nelson notes, “the massive
quantity of material in the Congressional Globe, in congressmen’s papers, in the state ratification
debates, and in the newspapers makes it clear that the amendment’s proponents reached no
agreement even on the issues they did consider.” 176
The brief debate over the stand-alone version of Section 1 highlights several unresolved
ambiguities in the rights and powers enumerated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Three
Republicans in the House discussed that provision during the two days of debate. Each defined
the scope what became Section 1 somewhat differently. On February 27, 1866, Representative
William Higby of California declared that the purpose of the first version of Section 1 was to
give Congress the power to enforce the privileges and immunities clause of Article I, Section 4.
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He did not mention whether the Joint Committee’s proposal would empower Congress or federal
courts to enforce any provision in the Bill of Rights in the states. 177 Representative William
Kelley of Pennsylvania then took the floor and maintained that the primary purpose of Section 1
was to enable Congress to enfranchise persons of color, a power he believed Congress already
possessed under Article I, Section 4. The next day, Bingham insisted that the proposed
constitutional amendment gave Congress power to enforce the Bill of Rights. He said nothing
about voting rights. 178
These differences over the scope of Section 1 may be more apparent than real. Most
Republicans spoke only briefly about Section 1 on the floor of Congress. Far more extensive
debates took place on the Fourteenth Amendment in the meetings held by the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction and in the Republican caucus. The possibility exists that at these meetings a
consensus developed on what rights Section 1 protected and the precise scope of congressional
power to enforce Section 1. Nevertheless, what evidence we have indicates that Republicans did
not reach or even try to reach a consensus on the scope of Section 1 when framing the Fourteenth
Amendment. No Republican attempted to reconcile different understandings of Section 1, even
when Democrats pointed out that the text was ambiguous. 179 The ink was hardly dry on the
Fourteenth Amendment when Republicans began to fight bitterly over precisely what rights they
had sought to protect a few years earlier. 180
Bingham hardly clarified the meaning of section 1 when, in response to a question asked
by Representative Andrew Rogers of New Jersey on the meaning of the due process clause, he
declared, “the courts have settled that long ago, and the gentleman can go read their
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decisions.” 181 Bingham was correct that a substantial body of state constitutional law existed on
the meaning of due process, 182 but that law was hardly settled. To take an issue dear to many
reformers’ hearts, some state courts had declared laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors
violated due process rights. 183 Others sustained such measures under state due process
clauses. 184 Bingham informed Congress that his proposed Fourteenth Amendment had no
bearing on state laws granting property rights to married women. 185 The Court of Appeals of
New York in White v. White, however, declared one such law violated the due process clause of
the state constitution. 186
Republicans may have legally resolved debates over the rights enumerated in Article I
and the powers enumerated in Article V, even if they were consciously seeking to resolve only
disputes over how to construct a constitutional politics that would entrench the Republican Party.
Just as constitutional provisions may not always mean what they were intended to mean, 187 so
the persons responsible for constitutional debates may settle controversies they did not intend to
settle. Most contemporary citizens believe that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
discrimination against Asian-Americans, even if such Republicans as William Higby insisted
that the scope of equal protection was limited to African-Americans. 188 The discussion in this
section, standing alone, does not refute originalist interpretations that rely on the public meaning
of the language Republicans used in Section 1, as opposed to their conscious intentions. 189
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Section 1 was nevertheless tangential to the original animating purpose of Fourteenth
Amendment. The Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress focused their attention on
the best, political feasible, means for reconstructing a constitutional politics that would privilege
Republican interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment and prevent the revival of the Slave
Power. Their goal was to make sure Republicans controlled the rights and powers enumerated
by the post-Civil War Constitution. Nelson notes, “What was politically essential was that the
North’s victory in the Civil War be rendered permanent and the principles for which the war had
been fought rendered secure, so that the South, upon readmission to full participation in the
Union, could not undo them.” 190 This emphasis on constitutional politics explains why members
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress made little attempt to resolve disputes among Republicans over the
meaning of those clauses in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that enumerated rights
and powers. Indeed, as the near complete absence of any discussion about judicial enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests, Republicans in 1866 were also not interested in
resolving future debates over the meaning of such phrases as “equal protection of the law”
between Republicans in one branch of the national government and Republicans in another
branch of the national government.

B. The Missing Judiciary

Federal courts and judicial review are as absent from the debates over the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment as the Republican Party is present. Members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress maintained a deafening silence on the constitutional authority of the federal judiciary.
No prominent framer emulated James Madison, who when introducing the Bill of Rights to the
190
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First Congress declared, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights.” 191 With one exception, no Republican explicitly claimed
that courts had any direct authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to
enforcing statutes that Congress passed under the Fourteenth Amendment. That exception was
an obscure member of Congress, Representative Giles Hotchkiss of New York, who spoke early
in the debate and, contrary to some scholarship, appears to have had no influence on the
evolution of either Section 1 or Section 5.
This silence reflects the Republican preoccupation with constitutional politics rather than
strong commitments to legislative supremacy. Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress were
drafting a constitutional amendment that they believed would entrench Republicans in all three
branches of the national government. Most expected that Republicans in Congress would
continue to play the leading role implementing the post-Civil War Constitution, but, at least
when the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated, Republicans did not detail how they
expected disputes between Republicans in Congress and Republicans on the Supreme Court over
the proper interpretation of any constitutional provision to be resolved. Just as Lincoln when
criticizing Dred Scott focused exclusively on the right of the majority party to resolve
constitutional ambiguities and did not offer a theory about the separation of powers, 192 so
Stevens and his partisan allies concentrated on creating a constitutional politics that would
enable Republicans to control the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment rather than a
constitutional politics that allocated constitutional authority in any particular way between the
governing institutions Republicans controlled. That was a subject for post-Fourteenth
Amendment debates.
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The persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment did not publicly debate the extent
to which Section 1 empowered federal courts to protect fundamental rights. From April 30,
1866, the day members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction introduced the omnibus five
section draft of the Fourteenth Amendment to Congress, 193 to June 13, 1866, the day the House
passed the final version of that five section draft, 194 no Representative or Senator stated on the
floor of Congress that the federal judiciary could directly enforce any provision of that
amendment. References to the judiciary in the Thirty-Ninth Congress were largely limited to
occasional attacks on the majority opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford 195 and more recent
opinions discussing the status of the seceding states. 196 Republicans who commented on various
iterations of what eventually became Section 1 discussed how that provision authorized Congress
to pass legislation sanctioning states and state officials who violating fundamental rights. They
emphasized the need for adding to the enumerated powers of Congress rather than holes in the
scope of existing enumerated rights. Hotchkiss aside, no one explicitly asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment was self-executing, that the Supreme Court could declare a state law
unconstitutional under any clause of Section 1, even if that law was consistent with all
congressional measures on the books implementing the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first version of what became Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment enumerated
only additional federal powers. That stand-alone proposal declared:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property. 197
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Bingham, who aggressively championed this language, interpreted the phrase “Congress shall
have the power” literally. His speech to the House of Representatives on February 28, 1866
championing this provision focused entirely on the need to augment congressional power to
protect fundamental rights. Bingham informed fellow representatives, “The question is, simply
whether you will give by this amendment to the people of the United States the power, by
legislative enactment, to punish officials of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them
by the Constitution? That is the question, and the whole question.” 198 In his view, no need
existed to enumerate additional constitutional rights. Bingham maintained, “there never was
even colorable excuse . . . for . . . claiming that any State Legislature or State court, or State
Executive, has any right to deny protection to any free citizen of the United States . . . in the
rights of life, liberty, or property.” What was needed was only an “addition grant of power . . . to
secure enforcement of these provisions of the bill of rights in every State.” 199
Bingham spoke of the first version of Section 1 as empowering only Congress even when
he directed legislative attention to past Supreme Court precedents on judicial power to protect
individual rights. Citing Barron v. Baltimore, 200 the Marshall Court decision refusing to enforce
the Fifth Amendment against the states, Bingham reminded Republicans that “the power of the
Federal Government to enforce in the United States courts the bill of rights under the articles of
amendment to the Constitution had been denied.” 201 Bingham did not, however, propose to
reverse Barron by a constitutional amendment that directly empowered federal courts to enforce
the bill of rights. Rather, after noting that federal courts presently had no power to prohibit states
from violating certain individual rights, Bingham declared that his proposed Fourteenth
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Amendment remedied that deficiency by authorizing the national legislature to empower the
federal judiciary to enforce the bill of rights in the states. He asserted, “but in the event of the
adoption of this amendment, if [state officials] conspire together to enact laws refusing equal
protection to life, liberty, or property, the Congress is thereby vested with the power to hold them
to answer before the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths of office.” 202
Bingham’s speech on February 28 repeatedly declared that a constitutional amendment
was necessary to give Congress the power to protect fundamental rights. 203 At no point did he
state or imply that judges would interpret what became Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as overruling Barron or otherwise construe those provisions as enumerating judicially
enforceable rights, except to the extent that Congress exercising the new enumerated powers
granted by the Fourteenth Amendment passed a federal statute authorizing courts to strike down
state violations of fundamental rights. 204 Bingham’s audience understood that the stand-alone
202
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version of Section 1 enumerated only additional congressional power. Representative Robert
Hale of New York interrupted Bingham to ask “whether in his opinion this proposed amendment
to the Constitution does not confer upon Congress a general power of legislation for the purpose
of securing to all persons in the several States protection of life, liberty, and property, subject
only to the qualification that that protection shall be equal.” 205
Immediately after Bingham finishing his speech defended the first version of what
became Section 1, Hotchkiss made the only speech on the floor of the Thirty-Ninth Congress that
clearly, though not explicitly, asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment should be self-executing,
that courts should be vested with the power to protect fundamental rights in the absence of a
federal statute. Hotchkiss’s very short speech observed that, as Bingham had stated, the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment merely “authorize(d] Congress to establish uniform laws
throughout the United States upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty, and
property.” 206 The New York Republican criticized that draft for leaving fundamental rights to
the “caprice of Congress.” Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment, Hotchkiss feared, did not “restrict
the power of the majority” or “protect the rights of the minority.” He wanted a Fourteenth
Amendment that established rights “that cannot be wrested from any class of citizens, or from
the citizens of any State by mere legislation.” For this reason, Hotchkiss advocated deleting the
reference “to Congress shall have the power” in Bingham’s proposed constitutional amendment.
Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall
discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as a
part of the organic law of the land, subject to be defeated by another constitutional
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amendment. We may pass laws here to-day, and the next Congress may wipe
them out. Where is your guarantee then? 207
Hotchkiss did not straightforwardly declare that his proposed equal protection clause was
directly enforceable by the judiciary. Still, when previously criticizing Bingham’s language
choices, he asserted, “Constitutions should have their provisions so plain that it will be
unnecessary for courts to give construction to them.” 208 Given Hotchkiss’s concern that the
rights set out in the Fourteenth Amendment not depend on legislation for implementation and his
reference to judicial interpretation, his speech on February 28 plainly called for a judicially
enforceable Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Roscoe Conkling of New York also
apparently endorsed a judicial enforceable Fourteenth Amendment when, immediately after
Hotchkiss finished, he stated, he “agreed with” the sentiments Hotchkiss expressed. 209
Whether, as many contemporary commentators maintain, Hotchkiss’s very short
speech 210 was “influential” 211 is doubtful. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction in late April
1866 revised what eventually became Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as Hotchkiss
prescribed, directly stating “No State shall” rather than “Congress shall have power.” 212
Nevertheless, no direct evidence exists that Hotchkiss or his concerns influenced this alteration.
The change in language was animated by a proposal former Congressmen Robert Dale Own of
Indiana made to Thaddeus Stevens in mid-March. 213 Whether Owens was even aware of
Hotchkiss’s speech is not known and no member of the Joint Committee publicly or privately
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declared that Hotchkiss or his concerns influenced the revised version of what became Section 1.
Bingham did not cite Hotchkiss or discuss independent judicial authority when he explained to
Congress why the Joint Committee revised the Fourteenth Amendment five years later during the
debate over the Enforcement Act of 1871. 214 More significantly, both Owens and the Joint
Committee had a very good reason for changing the language of Bingham’s proposed
amendment that had nothing to do with authorizing direct judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Owens proposed and the Joint Committee drafted an omnibus constitutional
amendment that incorporated provisions that had originally been debated as separate
constitutional amendments. Section 1 of the Joint Committee’s late April draft declared “No
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of
persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Section 5 stated, “Congress
shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” 215 If
Section 1 of the newly revised proposed Fourteenth Amendment retained the words “Congress
shall have power” and Section 5 was omitted, a fair inference could be made that Congress had
no power enforce Sections 2, 3 and 4. This was clearly not how members of the Joint Committee
expected the Fourteenth Amendment to work. Senator Jacob Howard if Michigan, when
introducing the Joint Committee’s handiwork to the Senate, asserted that Section 5 “gives to
Congress power to enforce by appropriate legislation all the provisions of this article of
amendment” 216 (emphasis added). Representative George Miller of Pennsylvania made the same
use of the plural noun when stating that Section 5 “is required to enforce the foregoing sections”
(emphasis added). That speech specifically noted that legislation was necessary to implement
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more than one section of the Fourteenth Amendment. 217 In short, the decision to divide
Bingham’s original amendment into Section 1 and Section 5 of the new Fourteenth Amendment
was probably made to ensure that Congress had the power to enforce all provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. No evidence exists that the members of the Joint Committee gave any
thought as to whether the new omnibus amendment made any provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment self-executing.
No member of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who spoke after the Joint Committee revised
the language of Section 1 asserted that the revised Fourteenth Amendment empowered federal
courts to protect fundamental rights. Bingham in his subsequent speeches evinced no awareness
that the Joint Committee, of which he was a member, made any change in the institutional
authority for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the newly revised Fourteenth
Amendment, he indicated, was identical to the stand-alone constitutional amendment that he had
previous stated would empower Congress to pass legislative prohibiting state violations of
fundamental rights. Bingham’s speech of May 10, 1866 asserted,
There was a want hitherto, and their remains a want now, in the Constitution of our
country, which the proposed amendment will supply. What is that? It is the power
in the people, the whole people of the United States, by express authority of the
Constitution to do that by congressional enactment which hitherto they have not
attempted to do: that is, to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of
all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its
jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional
acts of any State. 218
Other prominent members of Congress who had special insight into the Joint Committee’s
handiwork agreed with Bingham’s interpretation of the revised Section 1. Stevens, when
introducing the Joint Committee’s proposal to the House, stated that Section 1 “allows Congress
217
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to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which, operates upon one man
hall operate equally upon all.” 219 Senator Howard, when introducing the Joint Committee’s
proposal to the Senate echoed Bingham and Stevens by focusing entirely on how Section
empowered Congress. He declared,
The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the
power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great
fundamental guarantees. How will it be done under the present amendment? As I
have remarked, they are not powers granted to Congress, and therefore it is
necessary, if they are to be effectuated and enforced, as they assuredly ought to
be, that additional power should be given to Congress to that end. This is done by
the fifth section of this amendment, which declares that “the Congress shall have
power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.” Here is
a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the principles
of all these guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution.220
Howard did diverge from Bingham in one potentially important respect. Bingham never
intimated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment had any legal consequences in the
absence of a federal statute enforcing that provision. Howard, by comparison, made comments
suggesting that Section 1 had immediate legal consequences. The equal protection clause, he
claimed, “abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.” 221 Nevertheless, when
Howard discussed how the Fourteenth Amendment would be implemented, he spoke only of
federal legislation, and did not hint at direct enforcement by federal courts. Section 5, he
concluded,
casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the
sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith, and that no State
infringes the rights of persons and property. I look upon this claim as
indispensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon Congress this power and
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this duty. It enables Congress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with
the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal
congressional enactment. 222
No member of the Joint Committee even intimated that the language of what was now Section 1
had been changed to permit direct judicial enforcement of certain fundamental rights.
Republicans came close, perhaps very close, to asserting that federal courts could treat
the Fourteenth Amendment as self-executing only when debating how Section 1 would work
should Democrats return to power. Several Republicans celebrated the constitutional protections
enumerated in Section 1 for fundamental rights because they acknowledged that the Civil Rights
Act and other exercises of congressional power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
were “repealable by a majority.” 223 Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania claimed that
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would “prevent[] a mere majority from repealing the
[Civil Rights Act].” 224 A fair case can obviously be made that the representatives who made this
claim assumed that Republicans in the federal judiciary would protect Fourteenth Amendment
rights directly should Democrats in the elected branches of the government pass legislation
repealing statutory protections for fundamental rights. Nevertheless, this judicial power was
never explicitly asserted. No Republican took the floor of Congress and declared that the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment empowered the federal judiciary to protect rights in the
absence of legislation.
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That judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment was so obvious as to go unsaid
seems unlikely. Thousands of pages in the Congressional Globe report the debate over various
proposed Fourteenth Amendments and related measures. Members of Congress left very little, if
anything, either unsaid or to the imagination. Given the sheer number of words devoted to
Republican proposals to amend the Constitution, that no member of Congress even casually
stated that persons could vindicate constitutional rights by bringing a lawsuit based solely on
Section 1 seems astonishing.
The constitutional authority of the federal judiciary was not so entrenched or settled in
1866 as to make claims analogous to Madison’s assertion about “independent tribunals of
justice” unnecessary during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment. 225 Republicans in
1866 shared no common understanding about judicial power that could be taken for granted by
all members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress.

Some leaned toward judicial supremacy, while

others believed constitutional authority was vested in the national legislature. 226 Many adjusted
understandings of constitutional authority in light of rapidly changing political circumstances.
One strand of Republican thought before, during, and after the Civil War was sharply
critical of judicial authority. Many Republicans supported resolutions nullifying the Supreme
Court’s decisions in fugitive slave cases. 227 Abraham Lincoln declared he would not be bound
by the principles underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott and he flagrantly
ignored a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney. 228 Defying Dred Scott, the
Lincoln Administration treated persons of color as citizens of the United States and Republicans
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in 1862 passed legislation banning slavery in American territories. 229 Prominent Republicans
during the second session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress defended legislative supremacy.
Thaddeus Stevens maintained, “The legislative power is the sole guardian of [constitutional]
sovereignty.” 230 Many Republicans in the late 1860s supported bills stripping the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction, overruling judicial decisions in constitutional cases, and sharply limiting or
abolishing the Supreme Court’s power to declare laws unconstitutional. 231
Another powerful strand of Republican thought endorsed judicial authority. Most
Republicans were former Whigs, the antebellum party that tended to favor judicial supremacy. 232
Republican majorities consistently rebuffed radical attempts to curtail judicial power. When
some Republicans moved to weaken particular federal judiciary capacities, other and sometimes
the same Republicans moved to strengthen different federal judicial capacities. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the Removal Act of 1866 and the Removal Act of 1867 all expanded federal
judiciary authority to hear claims of federal right. 233 As Stanley Kutler and others have pointed
out, many Republicans during Reconstruction looked forward to a reconstructed federal judiciary
that would promote Republican constitutional visions in some unspecified way. 234
The presence of these strong anti-court and pro-court strands in Republican thought
counsels again using any master principle when trying to glean Republican attitudes towards
judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment from the sparse record. Republicans became
united on the need for judicial power only in late 1874, after Democrats had regained control of
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the House of Representatives. 235 Until then, inferences from silence and ambiguity about
prominent Republicans attitudes toward the constitutional authority of federal courts are
treacherous.
The dearth of discussion better supports the conclusion that Republicans did not think
seriously about federal judicial enforcement when they considered how the post-Civil War
Amendments would work than the view that Republicans had an implicit commitment to a
particular allocation of constitutional authority between the branches of the national government.
The same Republicans who never uttered a sentence of the form, “federal courts may directly
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,” also never made an assertion of the form “federal courts
may not directly enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.” The federal judiciary was largely missing
in action, not an enemy combatants or a loyal ally, during the debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment. For various reasons, the possibility of judicial review was simply not relevant to
the major problems Republicans faced when the Thirty-Ninth Congress in December 1865
debated proposed constitutional amendments.
From Republican perspectives, independent judicial authority to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment seemed unnecessary or unlikely for the foreseeable future. Many Republicans
believed that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 put in place powerful protections for persons of color.
They were prepared to pass additional legislation securing rights in the south should the
perceived need arise. As long as those laws remained on the books, federal judges could secure
fundamental rights solely by implementing federal statutes. Sections 1 and 5 would do sufficient
if they alleviated judicial doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act and related
measures. Radical Republicans who believed much more was immediately needed to protect
former slaves had good reason to be focused almost exclusively on the national legislature rather
235
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on than federal courts. Many proposals for implementing the Thirteenth (or Fourteenth)
Amendment required legislation. Congress could pass legislation providing all freedmen with
the proverbial forty acres and a mule, 236 but nothing in nineteenth century legal thinking
permitted a court to enact Thaddeus Steven’s preferred means for achieving freedom and racial
equality. Nothing in Republican experience suggested that members of the national judiciary
were likely to lead a crusade for racial justice. Federal courts, structured by the Judiciary Act of
1837, were bastions of pro-slavery constitutionalism before the Civil War. 237 A few state courts
declared Fugitive Slave Acts unconstitutional, but on matters of black citizenship and
segregation, state legislatures in the free states were far more egalitarian than state courts. 238 The
Judiciary Act of 1862 shifted the balance of judicial power northward by locating seven of the
nine reconstructed federal judiciary circuits entirely within states that remained loyal to the
Union. 239 Nevertheless, Democrats in 1866 exercised far more influence in the national
judiciary than in the national legislature. Five of the nine justices on the Supreme Court in
December 1865 were Democrats. 240 Four, Justices Nelson, Wayne, Grier, and Clifford, were
either in the majority in Dred Scott or were on record as supporting that decision. 241 The recent
judicial decision in ex parte Milligan 242 sharply restricting congressional power to impose
martial law, hardly gave Republicans cause for optimism that the justices were preparing to be to
active participants on the side of the angels in the fight for racial justice in the south. Given this
recent practice, the best Republicans could hope for in the foreseeable future was that the federal
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judiciary, particularly in light of clearer constitutional language, would more consistently sustain
legislation granting civil rights to persons of color. Congress in 1866 was the far better vehicle
for expanding the legal rights persons of color might enjoy after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The precise constitutional authority of federal courts was tangential to the concerns that
animated the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted above, 243 the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to create a constitutional politics that privileged government by those people who
remained loyal during the Civil War, the Republican Party being the instrument of those people
who remained loyal during the Civil War. 244 The threat Republicans faced in 1866 was the
possible return of the Slave Power augmented by 30 extra seats in the House of Representatives
and 30 extra votes in the Electoral College gained from an amended Constitution that permitted
former Confederate status to have disenfranchised persons of color counted as full persons when
representation was allocated. Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress vigorously debated the
best means for combating this threat that would be acceptable to most loyal free state citizens.
Section 2 and Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment were the consequences of that debate.
Republicans were also aware that loyal citizens did not agree on all matters concerning the fruits
of the northern victory in the Civil War, most notably on the best means for implementing the
promise of the Thirteenth Amendment. They were also no doubt aware that Republicans in one
institution of government might in the future disagree with Republicans in another institution of
government. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, was not directed at resolving present or
future disputes among Republicans. The goal of the Thirty-Ninth Congress was to ensure
Republicans controlled the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. What Republicans did with
243
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that power and the precise distribution of power between Republicans in the elected branches of
government and Republicans in the federal judiciary was for the future to decide.

C. The Original Design of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to construct a constitutional politics that
privileged the people who remained loyal, white and black, during the Civil War. Republicans
thought Section 2 the most crucial provision for securing their goal of retaining the partisan
control of the national government necessary for preserving and achieving the constitutional
commitment to majority rule and equality under law. Section 2 was designed to place white
southerners in a dilemma. Former Confederates could limit the ballot to white persons, in which
case they would not enjoy the representation necessary to reverse Republican policies on race
relations and other matters. Alternatively, they could grant the ballot to persons of color, in
which case a substantial number of southern representatives in Congress would support
Republican policies on race relations and other matters. If Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment worked as Republicans expected, Republicans would control all three branches of
the national government because a majority of the people who remained loyal during the Civil
War would vote for Republicans. Republicans in control of all three branches of the national
government would determine the scope of federal power to enforce the constitutional prohibition
on slavery and the constitutional commitment to equality under law. No reprise of Dred Scott
would occur because the representatives of the Slave Power who decided Dred Scott would not
have the power to implement the post-Civil War Constitution.
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The Republicans who framed the Fourteenth Amendment did not think they were settling
previous debates between party members over the precise scope of congressional power to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment or the differences that emerged in 1866 between party
members over the proper interpretations of “privileges and immunities” and other clauses in
Section 1. 245 Republicans after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified tended to interpreted
Sections 1 and 5 as enumerated the same rights and vesting Congress with the same powers as
they had claimed when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Second Freedmen’s
Bureau Act in 1866 were enumerated by Sections 1 and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. 246
Thaddeus Stevens, before and after the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, insisted that
Congress had the power to provide persons of color with a homestead. 247 Charles Summer,
before and after the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, insisted that the Constitution
empowered Congress to enfranchise persons of color. 248 More conservative Republicans, before
and after the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, disagreed with these claims. 249 Nevertheless,
when making these arguments, Republicans did not assert that intra-party squabbles over the
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment were settled by the Fourteenth Amendment. Prominent
members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction repeatedly denied that they were providing
representatives on either side of internal party debates over what policies promoted equality
under law with increased rhetorical ammunition for their constitutional vision. The
“compromise of principle” 250 in 1866 was that the Fourteenth Amendment would be neutral on
such controversies as whether the Constitution in December 1865 entitled persons of color to
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vote. Responding to Charles Sumner’s charge that the first version of Section 2 prohibited
Congress from enfranchising former slaves, Fessenden asserted,
It is not necessary that I should discuss the question; for my purpose here,
whether Congress has this power of legislation or not; whether it has it under the
clause guarantying a republican form or not. Opinions differ upon that subject;
but for the sake of the argument, admit that Congress has the power, how in the
world does this proposition deprive them of any power they have? 251
Stevens concurred. He informed the House of Representatives that the Joint Committee had no
intention of resolving intra-party debates over the constitutional status of black suffrage. 252
Contemporary claims that Republicans constitutionally committed Americans to the
concept of equality under the law rather than any particular conception 253 do not fully capture
how the Constitution framed in 1866 was designed to work. Some Republicans did assert that
the Fourteenth Amendment established or confirmed a constitutional commitment to the
principles of the Declaration of Independence. Miller declared Section 1 was “so clearly within
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence of the 4th July, 1776, that no member of this House
can seriously object to it.” 254 Nevertheless, Stevens and his partisan allies recognized that the
Devil could also quote scripture. Slave state constitutions before the Civil War included equal
protection clauses that provided no balm for slaves or free blacks. The way in which the Taney
Court and other jurists manipulated the antebellum Constitution left no doubt in Republican
minds that a Fourteenth Amendment controlled by former slaveholders could easily be
interpreted/manipulated to sanction the Black Codes. If, as noted in the introduction, many
Republicans thought laws forbidding woman to become attorneys were consistent with equal
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protection clause, 255 then former Confederates might easily insist that the “fitness of persons of
color for field labor” supported state laws limiting the legal profession to white males. 256 In
short, to use Ronald Dworkin’s terminology anachronistically, Section 2 was designed to ensure
that only Republican conceptions of equality under law were candidates for the official law of
the land.
Many Republicans hoped that the Constitution of 1866 would constitute constitutional
politics. Several indicated that Section 2 was likely to have positive effects on racial attitudes in
the South. Carl Schurz believed that once southerners experienced the benefits of the free labor
system, they would soon acknowledge that system to be far superior to the antebellum slave
labor system. “A general improvement will take place,” he wrote, “as soon as southern men
learn what free labor is and how to manage it in accordance with its principles.” 257 Senator
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts thought once southerners were forced to allow persons of color
to vote, whites and blacks would soon find common causes and racial hostility would disappear.
Politics would no longer be a contest between Republican egalitarians and Democratic white
supremacists, but between different factions all of whom accepted the basic constitutional
commitment to equality under law. Wilson maintained, that the “practical effect” of Section 2
would be this, and only this: it would raise up a party in every one of these States
immediately in favor of the enfranchisement of the colored race. . . . The
advocates of negro enfranchisement would themselves speedily grow up to
believe the justice, equity, and right of giving the ballot to the black men. 258
Republicans expected that the Constitution of 1866 would constrain, as well as construct
and constitute, constitutional politics, although the occasional confidence they expressed in
parchment barriers is puzzling given the overall thrust of their constitutional thought. As noted
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above, 259 several members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment
would prevent the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from being repealed should Democrats return to
power. Republicans who expressed this confidence in constitutional words, however, often
made arguments that cast out on enumeration, standing alone, as a constitutional strategy for
protecting fundamental rights. Stevens minutes before asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment
would make the Civil Rights Act “unrepealable” warned Congress that Democrats in power
would reinstitute slavery in disregard of the Thirteenth Amendment. No Republican on the floor
of Thirty-Ninth Congress explained why the text of the Fourteenth Amendment or alternative
constitutional language might prevent Republican measures promoting racial equality from being
repealed the day after Democrats took office.
Van Buren’s writings offer one solution to this apparent incongruity. The legitimate
party of the people, Van Buren acknowledged occasionally lost control of the national
government. He attributed the election of 1840, a Whig landslide, “mainly to a mistake in the
public mind, which it has since magnanimously acknowledged.” 260 Nevertheless, the legitimate
party of the people might be able to sufficiently entrench fundamental constitutional principles
so as to prevent the minority party from doing much damage during brief tenures of office. “The
long-continued support of a majority of the people,” Van Buren observed, “has secured a
preference for its principles of which it may well be proud.” 261 Thick governing arrangements
are neither easy to dismantle nor establish in two years. Whig fails to establish their cherished
American system during their very short periods in power. Their example may have given
Republicans confidence that the a complex reconstruction program developed by a secession of
Republican Congresses and presidents that was dedicated to realizing the principles of the
259

See notes ___, and the relevant text
Van Buren, Inquiry, p. 349.
261
Van Buren, Inquiry, p. 370.
260

96
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments could not be undone by Democrats only temporarily in
public office, particularly when Democrats did not control all branches of the national
government or crucial veto points within the national legislature.
In the long run, however, whether the Fourteenth Amendment worked depended on
whether Section 2 worked. If Section 2 privileged the party of the people, white and black, who
remained loyal during the Civil War, then previous congressional legislation securing the rights
of freedman and southern Unionists would remain on the books, congressional majorities would
be sufficiently nimble to pass new legislation in response to more creative southern efforts to
reinstitute slavery and white supremacy, the Union war debt would be redeemed, but not the
Confederate war debt, and no one would receive a penny as compensation for an emancipated
slave. Sections 1 and 4 might remain vital constitutional provisions, even if Republicans
occasionally lost their governing majority. Nevertheless, Republicans considered Section 2 the
most crucial provision in the Fourteenth Amendment. That proposal to alter the basis of
representation was the basis of the first constitutional amendment presented to Congress by the
Joint Committee and the provision in the omnibus Fourteenth Amendment that received the most
careful scrutiny and debate. Section 2 occupied this place of pride in 1866 because, Bingham
aside, no Republican claimed that the legal constraints on constitutional politics in Sections 1
and 4 would work unless the way in which Section 2 proposed to construct and eventually
constitute constitutional politics worked.
Many Republicans were nevertheless not convinced that Section 2 would work by the
time the substantially revised Fourteenth Amendment passed both Houses of Congress.
Prominent Republicans had sought far stronger measures for empowering persons of color and
Republicans in the south. Robert Dale Owen’s proposed omnibus Fourteenth Amendment
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contained muscular provisions constructing constitutional politics. That proposal, which excited
Thaddeus Stevens, 262 excluded all persons of color in any state from the state’s basis of
representation in the House and Electoral College whenever that state prohibited any black
person from voting. After July 4, 1876, the Owens proposal forbade all voting laws that
discriminated against persons of color. Section 3, as originally proposed by the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, disfranchised all persons who supported the Confederacy until July 4, 1870.
Both the Owens proposed Section 2 and the Joint Committee’s proposed Section 3 were
significantly weakened in part because of fears they would not be stomached by the Northern
electorate. The final Fourteenth Amendment enfranchised no person of color, disenfranchised no
former Confederate, and contained a weaker sanction for states that did disenfranchise some
persons of color.
More radical Republicans feared the new Fourteenth Amendment would not work. Many
claimed that proposed sanctions for race discrimination in voting would not lead former slave
states to enfranchise persons of color. 263 Others insisted that the constitutional failure to
disenfranchise former Confederates would enable a revived Slave Power to control southern
politics. 264 Stevens, who enthusiastically introduced the stand-alone Section 2 amendment to
Congress, far more wearily spoke of the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment immediately
before the House ratified. Section 2, he complained, “has not half the vigor of the amendment
which was lost in the Senate.” Worse, Stevens thought, the revised Section 3 “endangers the
Government of the country, both State and national; and may give the next Congress and
President to the reconstructed rebels.” 265 Nevertheless, Republican radicals towed the line.
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Stevens concluded his final speech on the Fourteenth Amendment by declaring: “let us no longer
delay; take what we can get now, and hope for better things in further legislation; in enabling
acts or other provisions. “ 266

V. The Collapse of the Constitution of Thaddeus Stevens

Thaddeus Stevens’s attempt to construct a constitutional politics controlled by the party
of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War proved no more enduring that James
Madison’s “Constitution Against Parties.” Both suffered almost immediately from
misalignments between expectations about how constitutional politics would work and the way
constitutional politics actually worked. Madison’s “Constitution Against Parties” proved almost
impossible to operate in the absence of political parties. 267 Stevens’s Constitution, designed to
entrench the rule of the party constitutionally committed to racial equality, was soon being
operated by a Republican Party whose crucial western constituency cared far more about
economic development than persons of color. By 1900, national constitutional politics in the
United States was marked by vigorous competition between two non-ideological parties and a
federal judiciary staffed by judges inclined to interpret Section 1 as authorizing courts to in the
absence of federal legislation to declare unconstitutional various state restrictions on the free
labor of white persons, 268 but less concerned with imposing legal constraints on state power to
maintain a racial hierarchy. 269

266
267
268
269

Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3148.
Cite to Milkis and Skowronek

99
A. The Fourteenth Amendment and the New Republican Majority

The Republican Party fared better than the Constitution of Thaddeus Stevens during and
after Reconstruction. With the exception of the Fifty-Third Congress, Republicans between
1866 and 1913 either controlled every elected branch of the national government or controlled at
least one elected branch of the national government. The judicial majority on the Supreme Court
until 1941 was appointed by a Republican President. In this political environment, Republicans
either enjoyed the power to promote their party’s interests and constitutional vision or, at the
very least, were sufficiently ensconced in the federal government to prevent contrary Democratic
measures from becoming the law of the land. Neither the Fourteenth nor Fifteenth Amendment
helped construct this constitutional politics that so favored the Republican Party. Congress never
passed legislation implementing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 3 was a dead
letter before the end of Reconstruction. The Fifteenth Amendment, which many Republicans
insisted substituted for Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a means for promoting
African-American suffrage and preserving partisan hegemony, was throughout the late
nineteenth century interpreted very narrowly and implemented only sporadically. Republicans in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries retained control of the national government
because Congress routinely granted statehood to low population Western territories with
Republican majorities long before granting statehood to higher population Western territories
with Democratic majorities. The party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War
became the party of the sparsely populated West.
This substitution of western voters for voters of color as a means for maintaining a
constitutional politics that privileged the Republican Party was doubly ironic. Republicans in
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1866 repeatedly criticized constitutional arrangements that privileged the south by vesting voters
in slave or white supremacist South Carolina with far more power than voters in free or
egalitarian Massachusetts. Representative Kelley of Pennsylvania was one of many champions
of what became Section 2 who asked Democrats whether they could
tell the men of the boroughs of Norristown and Allentown that one red-handed
rebel in South Carolina is of right and ought to be the equal of three of the best
and most patriotic of them on the floor of Congress or in the college for the
election of President and Vice President? 270
The strategy Republicans adopted to maintain power after 1866 was based on constitutional
arrangements that vested voters in underpopulated Republican Nevada with far more power over
national affairs than voters in well-settled South Carolina. As ironically, the constitutional
politics of western statehood enabled the Republican Party to redeem that coalition’s pre-Civil
War commitment to a west developed for white settlers while abandoning Thaddeus Stevens’s
vision of a Republican Party committed to racial equality.
Neither Section 2 nor Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment exercised any influence on
American constitutional development. 271 By June 1866 when the Fourteenth Amendment passed
Congress, Republicans had concluded that Section 2 would bear the onus for maintaining a
constitutional politics that privileged rule by the persons who remained loyal during the Civil
War. The Section 3 originally proposed by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction practically
guaranteed strong Republican representation from the south by prohibiting former Confederates
from voting in federal elections until 1870. Many Republicans called for permanent
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disfranchisement. 272 The final version of Section 3, which limited the right of some former
Confederates to hold federal office, promised only to affect the identity of the white supremacists
former Confederates sent to Congress. The General Amnesty Act of 1872 reduced Section 3 to a
dead letter for all practical purposes by opening all federal offices to all Confederates who had
not served in the national government before the Civil War. 273 By 1895, Republicans
acknowledged, “There are no longer any persons living on whom the provisions of section three
can operate.” 274 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment did no more work than Section 3. As
one of the few histories of that constitutional provision concludes, “There never has been a
successful implementation of the full provisions of section 2 of the fourteenth amendment. No
state has ever suffered a reduction in congressional representation through its disfranchisement
of adult male citizens.” 275
Section 2 played no role in constructing a constitutional politics that privileged the
Republican Party partly because that provision was not immediately needed to promote AfricanAmerican voting in the South and partly because that provision was almost immediately
superseded by the Fifteenth Amendment. While the Fourteenth Amendment was being ratified,
Congress passed the Military Reconstruction Act 276 and a series of readmission measures that
required former Confederate states to permit freedman to vote. 277 These statutes enfranchising
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persons of color left the Fourteenth Amendment without partisan bite when the Ninth Census
was taken in 1870. Largely because African-Americans in 1870 were eligible to vote in
southern states, the Fourteenth Amendment entitled former Confederate States to presentation
based on their entire population. As Gabriel Chin notes, Section 2 did not “offer() coverage
broader than other laws in force.” 278 The Secretary of Interior, after examining
disenfranchisement throughout the United States, informed Congress that legislation
implementing Section 2 would make only trivial changes in how representatives were allocated
by state. Rather than strip Rhode Island and Arkansas of one representative each, Congress
allowed representation to be based entirely on population. 279
Section 2 was further neutered when, shortly thereafter, Americans ratified the Fifteenth
Amendment, which forbade states from passing voting restrictions that discriminated on the
basis of race or color. Some prominent Republicans insisted that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was now either repealed or obsolete. Representative George Boutwell of
Massachusetts stated,
By virtue of the Fifteenth Amendment the last sentence of section two of the
Fourteenth Amendment is inoperative wholly, for the Supreme Court of the
United States could not do otherwise than declare a State statute void which
should disenfranchise any of the citizens described, even if accompanied with the
assent of the State to a proportionate loss of representative power in Congress. 280
Other Republicans, most notably Representative James Garfield of Ohio, disagreed. 281
Nevertheless, for the rest of the nineteenth century, Republican inspired legislative proposals and
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litigation aimed at empowering persons of color were based almost entirely on the Fifteenth
Amendment. 282
Those efforts failed miserably. A series of Supreme Court decisions in the late
nineteenth century sharply narrowed congressional power to implement the Fifteenth
Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment rights courts could protect in the absence of federal
legislation. Reese v. United States held that federal statutes and indictments had to specify that
persons of color were denied the ballot because of their race. 283 Williams v. Mississippi held that
state statutes were constitutional if the statute did not explicitly deny voting rights on the basis of
race, even when those measures were enacted for the purpose of preventing African-Americans
from voting. 284 A Congress committed to racial equality might have been able to work within
the narrow confines of judicial interpretation, 285 but Republicans after 1876 no longer had the
power or interest in passing strong laws enforcing Fifteenth Amendment rights. The Lodge
Elections Bill of 1890 failed when western Republicans abandoned efforts to provide substantial
oversight over southern elections. 286 When Democrats briefly regained control of all three
elected branches of government in 1892, they immediately repealed many voting rights laws
passed during Reconstruction. 287 Giles v. Harris subsequently ruled that courts were impotent to
deal with state practices that disenfranchised the vast majority of black citizens in the absence of
supportive federal legislation. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that if “the great mass of
the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting . . ., relief from [that] great political
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wrong . . . must be given . . . by the legislative and political department of the government of the
United States.” 288
Republicans made a tepid effort revive Section 2 as a vehicle for that relief during the
first decade of the twentieth century. 289 The Republican Party Platform in 1904 asserted, “We
favor such Congressional action as shall determine whether, by special discriminations the
elective franchise in any State has been unconstitutionally limited, and if such be the case, we
demand that representation in Congress and in the Electoral College shall be proportionately
reduced, as directed by the Constitution of the United States.” 290 Republican members of
Congress in 1904 and in 1906 proposed legislation implementing Section 2 that would
substantially reduce Southern representation in Congress and in the Electoral College unless
persons of color were enfranchised. No proposal got out of committee.
The Fourteenth Amendment also “failed” because many Republicans found the
admission of underpopulated western states to be an effective alternative for fashioning a
constitutional politics that privileged the values and interests of the white persons who remained
loyal during the Civil War. Before the Civil War, a general consensus existed that territories
would be granted statehood only when their population entitled them to one Representative in the
House of Representatives. Republicans during and after the Civil War abandoned this practice
when successfully admitting many Republican leaning territories with populations substantially
below this “ratio of representation” while delaying the admission of several Democratic leaning
territories that met antebellum statehood requirements. Nevada, which consistently supported
Republicans for the White House and consistently sent two Republicans to the Senate, was
admitted in 1864, despite having less than a fifth the population of the next least populous state.
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Democratic leaning Utah, which in 1864 had seven times the population of Nevada, joined the
Union only in 1896. The lame duck Republican majority in Congress on March 3, 1875 passed a
Colorado statehood bill that, by expediting the territorial referendum on statehood, ensured that
Colorado would be in the Union in time for state residents to vote in the 1876 national
election. 291 That state’s 3 electoral votes provided Republican Rutherford Hayes with his margin
of victory.
The way in which Republicans manipulated western statehood had substantial electoral
and political consequences. Had states been admitted according to pre-Civil War norms,
Democrats would have either controlled the national government from 1877-1889 or had the
power to prevent Republicans from repealing laws passed in the years within this time frame
when Democrats did have control of the national government. In fact, aided by Republican
Senators and Electoral College votes from underpopulated western states, Republicans controlled
the Senate for all but 2 years during this time period and the presidency for all but four years.
Only in 1893 and only for two years, did Democrats during this time have the control over
national institutions necessary to repeal Republican measures and enact Democratic substitutes.
Such Republican policies first enacted during the Civil War and Reconstruction as high tariffs,
Civil War pensions, aid to railroads and federal internal improvements survived the nineteenth
century because the votes cast by Republican Senators from underpopulated states prevented
Democrats from realizing their constitutional visions and preferred policies.
This turn to the west belied the majoritaritarian pretentions underlying the original
Republican attack on the Slave Power. As noted above, 292 Republicans before and during the
Civil War complained that the three-fifths clause and the imminent disfranchisement of persons
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of color would enable one voter in such states as South Carolina to exercise the same influence
on the partisan composition of the national government as several voters in such states as New
York. During the debates over admitting western territories, Democrats complained that one
voter in such underpopulated states as Nevada would exercise the same influence over national
policy as several voters in South Carolina. President Andrew Johnson, when vetoing a bill
authorizing statehood for Colorado, stated,
The population, it will be observed, is but slightly in excess of one-fifth of the
number required as the basis of representation for a single congressional district in
any of the States--the number being 127,000.
I am unable to perceive any good reason for such great disparity in the
right of representation, giving, as it would, to the people of Colorado not only this
vast advantage in the House of Representatives, but an equality in the Senate,
where the other States are represented by millions. With perhaps a single
exception, no such inequality as this has ever before been attempted. I know that
it is claimed that the population of the different States at the time of their
admission has varied at different periods, but it has not varied much more than the
population of each decade and the corresponding basis of representation for the
different periods. 293
Republicans were unsurprisingly indifferent to majoritarian concerns or the principle, one
person/one vote when western statehood was on the table. Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio,
defending statehood for Nevada, asserted that “In enabling the Territories to come into the
Union as States, I believe it will be found that the history of the Government is that very little
attention has been paid to the number of inhabitants at the time the people have been authorized
to form a State government.” 294
This effort to construct a constitutional politics that privileged the values and interests of
the white voters who remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War resurrected Republican
Party commitments announced immediately before the Civil War. Antislavery advocates during
the 1840s and 1850s bitterly complained that slaveholders exercised disproportionate power in
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the national government in general and over territorial policies in particular. Van Buren
Democrats and Northern Whigs/Republicans sharply criticized the Polk Administration for
settling the Oregon boundary dispute with Great Britain and failing to support internal
improvement projects in the northwest. 295 The Wilmot Proviso, which prohibited slavery in all
territories acquired from Mexico after hostilities, was advertised as an attempt to populate the
west with free white settlers. 296 These white settlers, antislavery advocates agreed, would return
control over national policy to free state citizens. 297 "We will engage in competition for the
virgin soil of freedom," William Seward declared after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act,
“and God give the victory to the side which is stronger in numbers as it is in right.” 298 In sharp
contrast to Thaddeus Stevens and other Radical Republicans in the immediate wake of the Civil
War, the vast majority of Republicans immediately before the Civil War declaimed any
immediate interest in race relations in the Southern states. Abraham Lincoln spoke for almost
the entire Republican Party when his First Inaugural Address declared he had neither the power
nor the interest in emancipating slaves in existing states. 299 Lincoln thought a policy of
confining slavery to existing states would eventually lead to the ultimate extinction of slavery in
the distant future. The future, however, was distant. Lincoln admitted that if Republicans
governed consistently with their 1856 and 1860 platform, a Republican Supreme Court in 1954
would still recognize the existence and legality of human bondage. 300
By 1896, the Republican Party had achieved every one of that coalition’s pre-Civil War
goals (and more). Antislavery advocates during the 1850s maintained they were in a race with
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the south to settle and control the west. 301 Republicans won. Republican congressional
majorities during and after the Civil War determined the boundaries of western states, the
conditions under which western states would be admitted, and the timing of western state
admission. The resulting territorial and statehood policies ensured that at the turn of the
twentieth century most western states had more in common politically, economically and
culturally with Republican midwestern states than with Democratic former Confederate states.
Antislavery advocates before the Civil War maintained that control over the west was an
essential means for ensuring that voters in the free states determined national policy. National
policy after the Civil War on such matters as the tariff and internal improvements promoted
northern interests in large part because Republicans representatives from underpopulated western
states cast crucial votes for tariffs and aid for economic development. 302 As Lincoln promised
when running for president, Southern racial policies did not spread through the country. Racism
was prevalent in the north and west in 1860 and at the turn of the twentieth century. 303
Nevertheless, no state or territory in which slavery was banned before the Civil War
disfranchised most male citizens of color or adopted comprehensive racial segregation policies.
Each western state admitted to the Union pushed the Republican Party further toward that
coalition’s original pre-Civil War commitments to white voters and away from the egalitarian
commitments that animated most party members, Thaddeus Stevens in particular, immediately
after the Civil War. While some western Republicans during Reconstruction initially supported
the radical wing of the Republican Party, 304 most in the following decades lost interest in
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protecting persons of color in the south. 305 Republican members of Congress from new states
preferred championing policies that promoted western economic development. Such former
Republican radicals as Senator William Stewart of Nevada proved quite willing to make deals
with southerners to achieve those ends. The final nail in Reconstruction’s coffin was laid in
1890, when western Republicans, after inducing increased southern opposition to the gold
standard, abandoned Senator Henry Cabot Lodge’s effort to push through Congress a bill
protecting black voting rights. 306

B. The Second Transformation of American Constitutional Politics
The Republican Party that depended on votes from underpopulated western states to
maintain control over national policy was not the Republican Party that framed the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Republican Party of Thaddeus Stevens and Abraham Lincoln was committed
to first preventing the extension of slavery and then to securing equality before the law for all
persons. Disagreements over such questions as the tariff were submerged so that the party could
present a united front on slavery and racial equality. 307 The Republican Party at the turn of the
twentieth century was committed to the protective tariff and national policies promoting
economic development. The failed Lodge Bill of 1890 demonstrated the willingness of crucial
Republican factions to submerge disagreements over racial equality when they threatened the
economic interests of vital Republican constituencies. 308 The Republican Party of Thaddeus
Stevens (and Martin Van Buren) maintained that the free people of the north needed to organize
305
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and maintain a permanent political coalition in order to preserve the Constitution’s majoritarian
and substantive commitments from an aristocratic Money/Slave Power. The Republican Party at
the turn of the century had become one of two major political parties that competed for the spoils
of government. Professor Stephen Skowronek describes this American regime that developed
during the late nineteenth century as a “state of courts and parties.” 309 Courts established the
legal constraints on government power and made policy by interpreting vague statutory
commands. Parties distributed patronage and other economic benefits. 310
American constitutional politics adjusted as a constitutional order designed to be run by
the party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War was replaced by a constitutional
order run by a two far less ideological parties. Political parties were the most important
development in American constitutional politics that took place during the decades before the
Civil War. Administrative agencies and the Australian ballot were the most important
developments in American constitutional politics at the turn of the twentieth century. The former
was a means to reduce the influence of political parties on public policy. 311 The latter was a
means to reduce the influence of political parties on elections. 312
The federal judiciary was a prominent beneficiary of a constitutional politics structured
by two non-ideological parties concerned primarily with distributing economic benefits.
Republicans after suffering defeat in national elections sharply increased federal judicial capacity
in order to entrench partisan commitments when passing the Judiciary Act of 1875 and the

309

Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities,
1877-1920 (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1982), p. 24.
310
Skowronek, Building a New American State, pp. 39-41 (Check Pages)
311
See Laura M. Weinrib, “The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v. Dennett and the Changing Face of Free
Speech,” 30 Law & History Review 325, 331 n.16 (2012).
312
See Bradley A. Smith, “Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply,” 28 Harvard
Journal on Legislation 167, 172-73 (1991).

111
Judiciary Act of 1891. 313 Both measures dramatically expanded federal jurisdiction and federal
judicial power. 314 By the turn of the century, both Republican and Democratic legal elites were
committed to the “cult of the court,” an understanding of American constitutional politics in
which judges rather than the legitimate party of the people were primarily responsible for
preserving the constitutional order and resolving constitutional ambiguities. Party lost influence
on the course of judicial decision-making. The course of constitutional law in 1900 seemed
largely impervious to the elections. 315 Justices appointed by Democrats and justices appointed
by Republicans were as committed to dual federalism and the freedom of contract. 316 Democrats
and Republicans shared the animus to class legislation that structured judicial thought at the turn
of the twentieth century. 317
The New Deal Constitutional Revolution institutionalized the constitutional
transformations in constitutional politics that had been taking place during the seventy years after
the Civil War. Constitutional developments during the 1930s and 1940s aligned American
constitutional commitments and institutional responsibilities consistently with the way two party
politics had been functioning since the turn of the twentieth century. The result was a liberal
version of the state of courts and parties. 318 Parties in the New Deal regime were responsible for
making economic policy and determining the precise balance of power between different
governing institutions. These responsibilities reflected common understandings that parties were
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well-suited for these tasks 319 and the widespread belief among New Dealers that the framers, as
good pragmatists, vested the national government with the power to regulate the national
economy and determine the allocation of power among governing institutions in whatever ways
elected officials thought best promoted the national welfare. 320 Federal courts were responsible
for protecting civil rights and civil liberties, 321 the most important constitutional constraints on
governmental power. These responsibilities developed in part because the federal judiciary was
thought to be the “forum of principle” in American constitutional politics 322 and, less
esoterically, because that institution was staffed by Republican and Democratic elites who were
far more committed to liberal notions of civil rights and civil liberties than the average member
of either the Democratic or the Republican party. 323 In this transformed constitutional politics,
constitutional theory was reduced to constitutional interpretation with a dollop of constitutional
authority. Constitutional politics was largely irrelevant to constitutional theory because the
judiciary, the one institution New Deals thought committed to constitutional principle, was
expected to transcend the party politics of the day. 324
As was the case with both Madison’s “Constitution Against Parties,” and Stevens’s
“Constitution of the One Legitimate Party,” the New Deal “Two-Party Constitution” began to
fall apart almost as soon as that constitutional order was institutionalized. Once again, a
mismatch developed between the theory of constitutional politics underlying the constitutional
regime and the way constitutional politics actually worked. The constitutional politics of the
New Deal was rooted in relatively non-ideological parties whose elite wings were more
319
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committed to liberal notions of civil rights and civil liberties than their mass bases. By the late
twentieth century, these parties had been replaced by two ideological parties, whose elites were
more polarized than ordinary citizens. The result was a constitutional order many described as
dysfunctional. 325 A full account of this story, Scheherazade reminds us, awaits another day. 326

VI. The Triumph of John Bingham’s Constitution

Professor Gerard Magliocca titled his excellent biography American Founding Son: John
Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment. That biography credits Bingham with
the authorship of “the most important sentence in the Constitution,” 327 the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment declaring:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Magliocca meticulously documents how Bingham tirelessly championed including these words
in the Fourteenth Amendment. 328 The Ohio Republican consistently prodded the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction to propose the privileges and immunities, the due process and the
equal protection clauses, and he fought for these provisions on the floor of Congress. Much of
what scholars know about the original meaning of Section 1 is derived from Bingham’s
speeches. Bingham was the only member of the House of Representatives who defended Section
1 at length, 329 one of two members of Congress who defended Section 1 at length, 330 and the
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only member of Congress who gave more than one lengthy speech on the merits of Section 1. 331
“Lincoln.” Magliocca concludes, “was our greatest constitutional poet, but Bingham was the
man who turned that poetry into prose.” 332
John Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment is our Fourteenth Amendment. 333 That
Fourteenth Amendment consists almost entirely of Section 1 and Section 5 as a means for
implementing Section 1. With the notable exception of cases involving whether convicted felons
have a right to vote, 334 the constitutional law of the Fourteenth Amendment is the constitutional
law of Section 1 and Section 5. Scholarly analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment is devoted
almost entirely to the proper interpretation of Section 1 and Section 5. Michael Kent Curtis, for
example, relied heavily on Bingham’s speeches when he demonstrated that the persons
responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit state officials from violating the
Bill of Rights. Books and articles with “The Fourteenth Amendment” in the title are almost
exclusively devoted to Section 1 and Section 5. 335 Sections 2, 3 and 4 are regarded as
constitutional afterthoughts. Magliocca describes as “anticlimatic” Bingham’s last speech
championing the Fourteenth Amendment, the one speech Bingham gave in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress that focused on Section 3 and Section 4. 336
A new biography of Thaddeus Stevens might be titled American Founding Orphan:
Thaddeus Stevens and the Lost Fourteenth Amendment. Stevens fought tirelessly for strong
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versions of what became Section 2 and Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his view,
persons of color could achieve racial equality in the United States only if a Republican Party
committed to racial equality controlled the national government and that Republican
“ascendancy,” he insisted, would continue only if persons of color voted and traitors were
disenfranchised. Stevens failed on all accounts. The final version of Section 2 neither directly
nor indirectly fostered racial equality at the ballot box. Section 3 was far weaker than Stevens
thought necessary to construct a constitutional politics that privileged racial equality. When
Stevens died in 1868, his Republican understanding that constitutional commitments were best
preserved by the political party of those who remained loyal during the Civil War was already in
the process of being by his former allies now increasingly more concerned with gaining votes
from white citizens from the north and west than from persons of color in the south. 337
The generation of racial egalitarians who successfully championed the second
Reconstruction in the 1960s 338 were more inspired by the constitutional provision Bingham
drafted than by the constitutional provisions that Stevens shepherded through Congress. The
liberal justices and litigators who successfully challenged Jim Crow relied entirely on Section 1,
which provided legal constraints on the states, 339 and Section 5, which empowered the federal
government to pass legislation implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality. 340
When liberals in the elected branches of government concluded that Sections 1 and 5 were too
weak a reed to attack some forms of segregation, the turned to the commerce clause of Article
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I. 341 The rare mid-twentieth century commentaries on Section 2 342 “fell stillborn from the
press.” 343
The prominent debate held on the pages of the Virginia Law Review over whether
originalists can defend Brown v. Board of Education 344 highlights the hold Bingham’s
Fourteenth Amendment has on the contemporary American constitutional imagination. Michael
McConnell published a lengthy essay asserting that the persons responsible for the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to prohibit racially segregated schools. 345 Michael Klarman at lesser
length insisted that most persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment accepted the
constitutionality of segregated schools. 346 Although neither essay cited Bingham, Bingham
might have been pleased by the way the authors framed the constitutional question at issue.
McConnell and Klarman assumed that the persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment
thought their efforts were directly primary toward providing new legal constraints on state
governments and empowering Congress to implement those legal constraints. Both assumed
prominent Republicans intended to settle the constitutional status of racial segregation in public
schools when they drafted and ratified the equal protection clause. McConnell purported to
“demonstrate that the belief that school segregation does in fact violate the Fourteenth
Amendment was held during the years immediately following ratification by a substantial
majority of political leaders who had supported the Amendment.” 347 Klarman asserted, “It is
inconceivable that most -- indeed even very many -- Americans in 1866 - 68 would have
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endorsed a constitutional amendment to forbid public school segregation.” 348 We may not know
what Bingham thought about Jim Crow education, but he, McConnell and Klarman agreed that
what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did about segregated schools depends on the
proper interpretation of the words used in Section 1.
Thaddeus Stevens might think the debate misguided. His Fourteenth Amendment was
not designed to resolve differences among Republican Party members or the people who
remained loyal during the Civil War over such specific applications of the constuitutional
commitment to equality under law as the constitutional status of segregated schools. Rather, the
Fourteenth Amendment Stevens championed was designed to ensure that Republicans, the party
of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War, controlled the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment for the foreseeable future. If Republicans decided that freedoms protected by the
Thirteenth Amendment entailed a racial equality inconsistent with segregated schools, then the
constitutional politics constructed by the Fourteenth Amendment would empower Republicans in
Congress to pass legislation prohibiting segregated schools and Republicans in the federal
judiciary to declare segregated schools unconstitutional. That, however, was for Republicans to
decide in the future. The Fourteenth Amendment Stevens championed did not purport to settle
any existing disagreement between Republicans in Congress or Republicans in different
branches of the national government.
Stevens would also have thought the debate between McConnell and Klarman irrelevant.
The Fourteenth Amendment Stevens championed that the security of fundamental rights depends
as much on the structure of constitutional politics as the particular legal constraints on
government power enumerated in a constitution. He and most of his partisan allies believed
Americans could achieve racial equality only if the party of the people who remained loyal
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during the Civil War continued to control the national government and determine the official
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. Dred Scott taught Stevens and other Republicans that in
the absence of a constitutional politics that privileged the election of those persons committed to
opposing the extension of slavery and promoting racial equality, sophisticated analysis of the
precise intentions of the framers responsible for particular constitutional provisions is unlikely to
be of much concern to constitutional decision makers. Both progressives and conservatives who
presently fight over the meaning of John Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment might benefit from
this lesson in constitutional politics.

